基于多物品委托拍卖的供应链协调研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0019

中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (5): 260-268.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0019

• 论文 • 上一篇

基于多物品委托拍卖的供应链协调研究

耿心宇¹, ², 秦开大¹

1.昆明理工大学管理与经济学院，云南昆明650500；2.常州大学商学院，江苏常州213159

收稿日期:2020-01-03 修回日期:2020-05-08 发布日期:2023-05-23
通讯作者: 秦开大（1971-），男（汉族），湖北潜江人，昆明理工大学管理与经济学院，教授，博士生导师，博士，研究方向：运营管理、拍卖理论，Email：kdqin2012@126.com. E-mail:kdqin2012@126.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71861020，72261023）；教育部人文社会科学规划基金资助项目（18YJA630089）；云南省哲学社会科学研究基地课题（JD2018YB11）；昆明理工大学管理与经济学院硕博生科研预研计划资助项目

Coordinating the Supply Chain in a Multi-Unit Consignment Auction

GENG Xin-yu¹, ², QIN Kai-da¹

1. Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650500, China;2. School of Business, Changzhou University, Changzhou 213159, China

Received:2020-01-03 Revised:2020-05-08 Published:2023-05-23
Contact: 秦开大 E-mail:kdqin2012@126.com

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于微分博弈理论研究了单一卖方和单一拍卖行组成的二级多物品拍卖供应链的契约协调问题。首先，从理论上证明了传统的佣金契约无法协调供应链。然后，提出了一种全新的收益补偿契约：商品售出时，拍卖行返还给卖方定额收益；商品流拍时，给予卖方流拍补偿金。分析表明，收益补偿契约在非合作博弈下无法协调供应链，但在合作博弈下可以协调供应链，最优契约参数间呈线性关系。此时，卖方和拍卖行的利润分配比例受谈判能力和谈判砝码的共同影响，调节流拍补偿金可调整双方各自承担的系统风险的大小。最后，通过算例分析验证了上述结论。

关键词: 多物品拍卖；供应链协调；非合作博弈；合作博弈

Abstract: Auction houses play some important roles in gathering and releasing information about supply and demand, valuing commodity valuation, and supervising auction processes. As a result, more and more sellers tend to entrust a third-party auction house to replace themselves for organizing auction activities. The coordination of a supply chain with a seller and an auction house is studied. The seller consigns his homogeneous commodities to the auction house. The auction house sells the commodities by a discriminatory auction with a secret reservation price.

Key words: multi-unit auction; supply chain coordination; noncooperative game; cooperative game

中图分类号:

F724.59

耿心宇, 秦开大. 基于多物品委托拍卖的供应链协调研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(5): 260-268.

GENG Xin-yu, QIN Kai-da. Coordinating the Supply Chain in a Multi-Unit Consignment Auction[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(5): 260-268.

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基于多物品委托拍卖的供应链协调研究

Coordinating the Supply Chain in a Multi-Unit Consignment Auction

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