基于零售商公平偏好的联合碳减排与低碳宣传微分对策研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1302

中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (7): 173-182.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1302

基于零售商公平偏好的联合碳减排与低碳宣传微分对策研究

姜跃¹, 韩水华², 赵洋³

1.福建理工大学管理学院，福建福州350118; 2.厦门大学管理学院，福建厦门361005;3.山东工商学院工商管理学院，山东烟台264005

收稿日期:2021-07-02 修回日期:2021-11-16 出版日期:2023-07-17 发布日期:2023-07-17
通讯作者: 姜跃(1985-)，女（汉族），辽宁营口人，福建理工大学管理学院，副教授，硕士生导师，博士，研究方向：供应链管理、运作管理等，Email：jiangyuehxg@126.com E-mail:jiangyuehxg@126.com
基金资助:
福建省社会科学基金资助项目(FJ2021B152，FJ2019B091);福建省创新战略研究项目(2022R0055,2022R0056)

Differential Game on Joint Carbon Emission Reduction and Low-carbon Promotion with Considering Retailer’s Fairness Preference in Supply Chains

JIANG Yue¹, HAN Shui-hua², ZHAO Yang³

1. School of Management，Fujian University of Technology, Fuzhou 350118, China;2. School of Management, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China;3. School of Management, Shandong Technology and Business University, Yantai 264005, China

Received:2021-07-02 Revised:2021-11-16 Online:2023-07-17 Published:2023-07-17
Contact: 姜跃 E-mail:jiangyuehxg@126.com

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在低碳经济下，零售商的促销和公平偏好会影响制造商的决策，同时考虑到碳减排的多周期性和动态性，引入时间因素，把零售商的促销和公平偏好引入到供应链减排的微分博弈模型中，构建了一个由制造商和具有公平偏好的零售商组成的供应链减排微分博弈模型，比较分析了分散决策和集中决策两种情况下的供应链的最佳策略。研究发现，随着时间的变化，产品的碳减排量逐步上升，但是上升的速度越来越慢，并且逐步趋于稳定；同时还发现，零售商的公平偏好存在一临界点，当零售商的公平偏好小于该值时，集中决策时零售商的促销努力程度大于分散决策；当零售商的公平偏好大于该值时，分散决策时零售商的促销努力程度大于集中决策。本文所得结论可以为制造商和零售商的决策提供理论依据。

关键词: 微分博弈;供应链;碳减排;公平偏好

Abstract: With the excessive consumption of energy, abnormal climate and environmental pollution becoming increasingly prominent, countries all over the world began to advocate low-carbon economy, which is the general trend of world economic development. Under the constraints of relevant laws and regulations, more and more enterprises gradually realize the importance of reducing carbon emissions and begin to improve the produce technics and produce low-carbon products. At the same time, with the deepening of low-carbon awareness, consumers with low-carbon awareness gradually tend to buy low-carbon products. The higher the emission reduction of products, the greater the market demand. However, the carbon emission reduction of products still needs to be transmitted to consumers through the low-carbon promotion of retailers, which shows that on the one hand, product emission reduction needs to rely on the emission reduction efforts of manufacturers, On the other hand, retailers' promotion of low-carbon products is also of great significance. Therefore, it is very important to study product emission reduction and low-carbon promotion from the perspective of supply chain.

Key words: differential game; supply chain; carbon reduction; fairness preference

中图分类号:

F124.5
F224

姜跃, 韩水华, 赵洋. 基于零售商公平偏好的联合碳减排与低碳宣传微分对策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(7): 173-182.

JIANG Yue, HAN Shui-hua, ZHAO Yang. Differential Game on Joint Carbon Emission Reduction and Low-carbon Promotion with Considering Retailer’s Fairness Preference in Supply Chains[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(7): 173-182.

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基于零售商公平偏好的联合碳减排与低碳宣传微分对策研究

Differential Game on Joint Carbon Emission Reduction and Low-carbon Promotion with Considering Retailer’s Fairness Preference in Supply Chains

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