零售商自有品牌与制造商直销渠道的互动博弈问题研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.01.013

中国管理科学 ›› 2016, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (1): 107-115.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.01.013

零售商自有品牌与制造商直销渠道的互动博弈问题研究

李海¹, 崔南方², 徐贤浩²

1. 中南财经政法大学工商管理学院, 湖北武汉 430073;
2. 华中科技大学管理学院, 湖北武汉 430074

收稿日期:2013-12-09 修回日期:2015-05-10 出版日期:2016-01-20 发布日期:2016-01-28
通讯作者: 李海(1982-),男(汉族),湖南邵东人,中南财经政法大学工商管理学院讲师,博士,研究方向:供应链管理、营销科学,E-mail:hikee009@126.com. E-mail:hikee009@126.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502716);湖北物流发展研究中心课题(2015A02);中南财经政法大学高校基本科研业务费青年教师创新项目(20132033)

Game Analysis on the Interplay Between Introduction of Store Brand by Retailer and Direct Channel by Manufacturer

LI Hai¹, CUI Nan-fang², XU Xian-hao²

1. School of Business Administration, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China;
2. School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China

Received:2013-12-09 Revised:2015-05-10 Online:2016-01-20 Published:2016-01-28

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 零售商引入自有品牌与制造商引入直销渠道是普遍存在的商业现象。研究了零售商引入自有品牌产品和制造商引入直销渠道之间的博弈竞争关系,得出了制造商与零售商的博弈均衡策略。在此基础上,进一步分析了制造商和零售商在不同的博弈均衡下相对于初始状态的利润变化情况,得出了双方可能陷入囚徒困境或双赢的前提条件。研究表明,只有在SB产品质量水平较低且直销渠道销售成本较低的情况下,制造商才有可能由于引入直销渠道而利润改善。而当SB产品的质量达到较高水平时,即使制造商引入直销渠道进行竞争胁迫,零售商引入SB产品利润仍然会得到改善,且不受直销渠道竞争情况的影响。制造商与零售商均进入双赢状态的一个必要条件是自有品牌产品的质量不能超过制造商产品质量的四分之三。当SB产品质量水平较低且直销渠道的销售成本适中的时候,双方陷入囚徒困境。

关键词: 自有品牌, 直销渠道, 销售量决策, 博弈论

Abstract: The introduction of store brand (SB) by retailer and direct channel by manufacturer are very prevailing business phenomenon nowadays. On the one hand, the introduction of SB cannibalizes the demands for national brand (NB) and benefit retailer by upstream entry. On the other hand, the introduction of direct channel may help manufacturer to enhance his competitiveness and mitigate the threat from SB introduction by retailer. In this paper, by using game model, the interplay between them was investigated and both parties' equilibrium strategies were found. Furthermore, the change of parties' profits in contrast to original state were analyzed in this paper. It shows that both parties may fall into prisoner's dilemma or win-win situation and the necessary conditions for these two results are found. The manufacturer's profit can be enhanced with the introduction of direct channel only when the quality level of SB is low and the sale cost of direct channel is low. When the quality level of SB is high, the retailer can benefit from the introduction of SB introduction even facing the competition from manufacturer's direct channel. In this case, retailer's profit is always enhanced and not hurt by the introduction of direct channel by manufacturer. Besides, the necessary condition that the quality of SB product is less than three quarters of the quality of NB product must be satisfied for win-win situation. And the manufacturer and retailer may fall into prisoner's dilemma when the quality level of SB is low and the sale cost of direct channel is moderate.

Key words: store brand, direct channel, sale quantity decision, game theory

中图分类号:

F713

李海, 崔南方, 徐贤浩. 零售商自有品牌与制造商直销渠道的互动博弈问题研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(1): 107-115.

LI Hai, CUI Nan-fang, XU Xian-hao. Game Analysis on the Interplay Between Introduction of Store Brand by Retailer and Direct Channel by Manufacturer[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(1): 107-115.

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零售商自有品牌与制造商直销渠道的互动博弈问题研究

Game Analysis on the Interplay Between Introduction of Store Brand by Retailer and Direct Channel by Manufacturer

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