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中国管理科学 ›› 2018, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (1): 118-127.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.04.012

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

第三方回收商领导型两级闭环供应链的回收与定价策略

冯章伟1, 肖条军1,2, 柴彩春2   

  1. 1. 南京大学工程管理学院, 江苏 南京 210093;
    2. 南京财经大学博弈行为与运作管理研究所, 江苏 南京 210046
  • 收稿日期:2016-05-10 修回日期:2016-12-15 发布日期:2018-03-19
  • 通讯作者: 冯章伟(1990-),男(汉族),浙江嘉兴人,南京大学工程管理学院,博士研究生,研究方向:物流与供应链管理、行为决策分析,E-mail:fzw@smail.nju.edu.cn E-mail:fzw@smail.nju.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:

    国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(71425001);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371093);江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(KYCX17_0014)

Recycling and Pricing Strategies of Closed-Loop Supply Chain by the Leader of Third-Party Recycler

FENG Zhang-wei1, XIAO Tiao-jun1,2, CHAI Cai-chun2   

  1. 1. School of Management and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China;
    2. Institute of Game Behavior and Operations Management, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 210046, China
  • Received:2016-05-10 Revised:2016-12-15 Published:2018-03-19

摘要: 与一般废旧产品的回收产品再制造相比,废弃电子电器产品回收拆解后需要兼顾产品与零部件再制造,从而减少电子电器产品对环境的污染,推进资源的重复利用。为了探讨第三方回收商的回收与定价策略对供应商和制造商的影响,本文构建由单一供应商、制造商和第三方回收商组成的两级再制造闭环供应链,建立Stackelberg博弈模型,研究两级再制造情形下和仅产品再制造情形下回收商的有效回收比例、回收定价和回收努力程度等决策,并对两种再制造情形下供应链各成员的决策与收益进行对比分析。研究发现:对于回收商而言,回收数量、有效回收比例的增加有助于回收商获得更多的额外收益。如果在仅产品再制造情形下的有效回收比例较大,回收商的决策和收益主要取决于无效零部件的回收价。当无效零部件的回收价较低时,回收商在仅产品再制造情形下的决策和收益更优;反之,回收商在两级再制造情形下的决策和收益更优。对于其他供应链成员而言,两种再制造策略都能够降低供应商和制造商的定价,促进市场需求的增加。具体而言,不同的再制造策略对批发价、零售价和市场需求的影响与有效回收比例和无效零部件的回收价密切相关。

关键词: 废弃电子电器产品, 两级再制造, 第三方回收, 有效回收比例, 博弈论

Abstract: Many suppliers and manufacturers allow a third-party recycler to perform recycling operations of Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment, then encourage the third-party recycler to disassemble these end-of-life products either for products remanufacturing or parts remanufacturing, which is of great importance in reducing environment pollution and promoting the reuse of resources. In this paper, recycling and pricing strategies of the third-party recycler are investigated in a closed-loop supply chain with two-echelon remanufacturing. Stackelberg game models of a closed-loop supply chain with two-echelon remanufacturing consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and one third-party recycler are developed. The returns price, effective recovery ratio, and recycling effort level are integrated within a modeling framework.The positive effect of two-echelon remanufacturing on effective utilization of the invalid parts,and its negative effect on the probability that the third-party recycler should handle the dismantling cost,are explicitly modeled. By the comparison of equilibrium decisions and profits under two remanufacturing strategies, it is found that (i) high quantity and the effective recovery ratio will contribute to the third-party recycler's profit; and (ii) remanufacturing strategies can reduce the wholesale price and sale price, and promote the demand, while the profits may not be improved; and (iii) when the effective recovery ratio under product remanufacturing is higher than that under two-echelon remanufacturing, recyclers' decisions and profit mainly depend on invalid parts' recycling price. Recyclers' decisions and profit under product remanufacturing turns better if the recycling price of invalid parts is sufficiently low. Otherwise, the recyclers' decisions and profit under two-echelon remanufacturing turns better. Moreover, numerical studies are employed to gain more intuitive insights. The field of two-echelon remanufacturing strategies are extended in the closed-loop supply chain and some new results are found. These new results may propose some constructive suggestions for the dominant third-party recycler in the reverse logistics.

Key words: WEEE, two-echelon remanufacturing, third-party recycler, effective recovery ratio, game theory

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