主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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中国管理科学 ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (3): 1-10.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.03.001

• 论文 •    下一篇

社交网络推送下的众筹融资机制分析

屈绍建1, 卢艳玲1,2, 纪颖1   

  1. 1. 上海理工大学管理学院, 上海 200093;
    2. 河海大学商学院, 江苏 南京 210000
  • 收稿日期:2017-06-30 修回日期:2017-12-25 出版日期:2019-03-20 发布日期:2019-04-28
  • 通讯作者: 卢艳玲(1993-),女(汉族),山东潍坊人,上海理工大学管理学院硕士研究生,河海大学商学院博士研究生,研究方向:众筹,E-mail:18721107937@163.com. E-mail:18721107937@163.com
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金资助项目(17BGL083);上海理工大学基金资助项目(SK17ZD03)

The Analysis of Crowdfunding Financing Mechanism Based on Social Network

QU Shao-jian1, LU Yan-ling1,2, JI Ying1   

  1. 1. Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China;
    2. Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 210000, China
  • Received:2017-06-30 Revised:2017-12-25 Online:2019-03-20 Published:2019-04-28

摘要: 众筹作为一种新型的互联网融资模式,发展迅速且前景广阔,融资者也凭借其项目动态更新度而极力吸引潜在投资者参与众筹,但却少有出现我国商业营销中常见的基于社交网络推送的营销宣传模式。在众筹平台以及社交平台不收取平台服务费的前提假设下,以项目融资者的净筹资额最大化和投资者的预期期望收益最大化为目标,提出了三种不同的众筹融资机制。通过分析社交化众筹与非社交化众筹的完全信息动态博弈模型,我们发现:当社交综合投入成本较高时,"社交化-众筹"融资机制只有在社交提高系数较大以及社交平台的最低成本限制较低的情况下才能够实现众筹净融资额度的增加,但是"众筹-社交化-众筹"模式在任何情况下的融资量均较"社交化-众筹"的高;合作情况下的全社交化的产品众筹单价以及社交平台的广告宣传投入值要高于非合作情形下的值。最后,我们对比分析了不同的融资机制以及现有的众筹社交化案例,认为众筹市场的社交网络推送营销现象完全具有存在的必要。

关键词: 社交网络, 平台推送, 产品众筹, 博弈论

Abstract: Crowdfunding, a new internet financing mode, has undergone rapid development since it arises in China and has a thriving prospect in the long run. For the purpose of attracting numerously potential investors to participate this financing activity, initiator seeks to utilize many methods, including the degree of project dynamic update and adverse incentive, to enhance the popularity of crowdfunding project. However, there is lack of a special marketing mode based on social network in the process of propagandistic crowdfunding project. In order to explore the acceleration effect of social network marketing in existing crowdfunding mode, three crowdfunding mechanisms are raised where an initiator advertises his financing project through social network compared with traditional crowdfunding publicity relied on crowdfunding platform merely, meanwhile, considering to put social network publicity into the different period of crowdfunding. Further, the total purchase function with demand depending on price and the publicity degree of social network under three modes is investigated based on the hypothesis of Homo Economicus, and the revenue model is built based on the dynamic games of complete information theory. Finally, the equilibrium results of non-social network marketing and existing social network publicity in crowdfunding activity are discussed based on revenue maximization and Stackelberg game. The equilibrium results signify when the social comprehensive cost is higher, the "social-crowdfunding" mode can achieve the increasement of net financing amount if the social enhancement coefficient is high enough and the minimum cost restriction requested by social platform is relatively low. But the "crowdfunding-social-crowdfunding" mode can achieve a higher financing amount compared with the "social-crowdfunding" mechanism in any situation. Additionally, the crowdfunding price of product and the advertising degree on the social network are both higher in cooperation case. In conclusion, through analyzing and contrasting different financing mechanism and illustrating the presented cases of social crowdfunding, it is concluded that the marketing incentive of social network is completely necessary in emerging crowdfunding market. In brief, theoretical basis and practical gist for exploring and optimizing the social mechanism in crowdfunding project are provided in this paper.

Key words: social network, platform push, product crowdfunding, game theory

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