Abstract:

The mixed ownership economy has been an important implementation form of my China's basic economic system， which pointed out at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee. The 2021 government work report also clearly clarified deepening the reform of mixed ownership. Moreover， the three-year action plan for the reform of state-owned enterprises （2020-2022） proposes to focus on improving the market-oriented operation mechanism and speed up the construction of the professional manager system. The introduction of these policy documents provides a clear direction for state-owned enterprises in the process of mixed ownership reform， also showed the important influence of executive incentives in state-owned enterprises on corporate governance after the mixed-ownership reform. In the process of mixed ownership reform， state-owned enterprises after reform have two types of differentiated principals， state-owned and non-state-owned shareholders. Both state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital are important participants in corporate decision-making. However， they have consistent economic goals， but conflicting social goals. Different principals have different incentive goals and different incentive models will have different effects on the behaviors of manager. Moreover， manager’s behaviors are susceptible to emotional factors. For this reason， based on the FS model， BO model， and common agency theory， double-principal agency incentive mechanism is explored when manager is fully rational under the condition of information asymmetric further discusses how the effort choice and compensation incentives is effect by considering manager’s fairness preference.Meanwhile， the dynamic evolution process of the influence of the double-principal incentive behavior on the manager’s effort choice under different initial states is simulated through MATLAB software. The main conclusions show that： （1）The manager will consider the incentive gap between the two tasks， and tendency to complete tasks with a higher output incentive coefficient； （2） The optimal effort of manager is positively correlated with the level of control rights； （3） The optimal effort of manager and incentive compensation are positively correlated with the intensity of jealousy and pride， and are negatively correlated with the intensity of empathy； （4） Under the same circumstances， compared with a fully rational manager， the manager’s fairness preference can increase the optimal level of effort and has a significant incentive effect.The conclusion of this paper is helpful to enrich the research on the influence of fairness preference on principal-agent theory， and it is of significance for studying the level of decentralization of state-owned enterprises based on the reform of mixed ownership and improving the incentive mechanism of managers. In the future， when promoting the development of mixed ownership from the policy level and promoting the synergy between state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital based on their respective comparative advantages， the government should further construct a reasonable policy system， improve both the professional manager system and the market-oriented operation mechanism. State-owned enterprises should actively seek cooperation with non-state-owned capital and choose a reasonable level of decentralization， in order to reduce the transaction costs of the participants in the mixed ownership reform and improve the efficiency of the mixed ownership reform.

Key words: fairness preference, double-principal, incentive mechanism, principal-agent