Abstract: To relieve the pressure of energy conservation and emission reduction, how to drive green technology innovation through effective environmental policies is an important practical issue that needs to be solved urgently, in the context of China’s “double carbon” goal. Based on multi-agent relationship analysis, evolutionary game theory, and scenario simulation method, the two-party evolutionary game model of government and enterprise, the two-party evolutionary game model of public and enterprise, and the three-party evolutionary game model of government, public, and enterprise are constructed. Besides, policy simulation under different scenario modes and execution strengths are conducted to comprehensively explore the behavioral strategy selection and system evolution trajectory of the government, public, and enterprises in green technology innovation. The results show that: (1) In the two-party evolutionary game, the green technology innovation behavior of enterprises is closely related to its cost and benefit. However, effective public participation provides the possibility for enterprises to conduct green technology innovation behavior when the cost is less than the benefit. In other words, public participation is the key factor for enterprises to change short-sighted behavior and carry out forward-looking innovation; (2) In the three-party evolutionary game, the steady-state conditions of government and public are the same as those in two-party evolutionary game models. However, the steady-state condition of enterprises needs to consider the impact of the public report on corporate reputation, which is an important reference factor for enterprises to make decisions on green technology innovation behavior; (3) With the increase of environmental protection publicity, technology innovation incentive, environmental regulation, public concern, and public report, the evolution of enterprises’ innovation behavior of choosing green technology is accelerating, and green technology innovation is promoted by government behavior and public participation significantly. To sum up, on the basis of exogenous guidance of government behavior, public participation should be encouraged to guide the green technology innovation behavior into the endogenous evolution path considering the enterprise profit.

Key words: green technology innovation; government behavior; public participation; evolutionary game model; scenario simulation