Abstract: Market-based and green-investment-based environmental policy instruments enrich the existing command-and-control instrument, and may also induce more complex corporate environmental protection behavior responsiveness. There has the uncertainty of the“production cut” and “green development.” Based on the micro-dataset of pollution-intensive and listed enterprises in during 2011-2019, econometric models are adopted and the corporate environmental protection behavior responsiveness induced by heterogeneous environmental policy instruments is analyzed. The results show that, both environmental supervision and pollution fee induce green development, including significant environmental expenditure and green innovation. Environmental subsidy leads to the green development majored by environmental expenditure. As for the instrument mix, the incompatibility is concluded between environmental supervision and pollution fee, and two instruments weaken each other’s green development effect. Furthermore, in enterprises with looser financial constraints and higher entrepreneurship levels, pollution fee induces more significant green development. Environmental subsidy is more effectiveness for green development in enterprises with financial constraints. The results imply that governments should understand the heterogeneous outcomes by policy instruments, choosing the appropriate instrument and mix to specific enterprise with different characteristics.

Key words: environmental policy instrument; environmental protection behavior responsiveness; policy instrument mix; pollution-intensive enterprise