跨国绿色创新国际合作中机会主义行为治理机制研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0862

Abstract

Abstract: International cooperation on green innovation is an effective way to improve the green innovation capability of local enterprises and expand the development space of foreign enterprises. Nevertheless, opportunistic behavior in the process of international cooperation has shortened the international cooperation period of green innovation. Based on evolutionary game theory and simulation methods, this paper focuses on the governance mechanism of opportunistic behavior in international cooperation on green innovation, and the relationship between foreign direct investment, outward direct investment and government supervision on the governance of opportunistic behavior in international cooperation on green innovation. It is shown shows that the increase of foreign direct investment and the government supervision that matches the market conditions and industry categories can effectively restrain the opportunistic behavior in the international cooperation on green innovation, and make a transform to reciprocal strategy. However, foreign direct investment has little inhibitory effect on it due to the weak reverse technology spillover effect. In the meanwhile, optimistic market prospects for the international cooperation on green innovation will significantly restrain the opportunistic behavior in international cooperation and help to maintain long-term cooperation on green innovation, but the pessimistic prospects will be detrimental to the stability of international cooperation on green innovation. In conclusion, the best governance mechanism of opportunistic behavior is designed to help to reach the win-win goal of international cooperation on green innovation.

Key words: transnational green innovation, international cooperation, opportunism, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

F224.32

YANG Wen-ke, ZHANG Guang-xin, HE Jian-min. Research on Governance Mechanism of Opportunistic Behavior in International Cooperation on Green Innovation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(4): 213-224.

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Research on Governance Mechanism of Opportunistic Behavior in International Cooperation on Green Innovation

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