主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2018, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (5): 169-177.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.05.017

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Analysis on the Behavioral Strategy of Participants on Online Lending Market based on Evolutionary Game Theory——A Trilateral Game Perspective

LIU Wei, XIA Li-qiu   

  1. School of Management Science & Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China
  • Received:2016-11-26 Revised:2017-08-14 Online:2018-05-20 Published:2018-07-30

Abstract: The default events often occur on online lending market which damages the interests of participants due to lack of supervision and credit risk management. In this paper, a trilateral evolutionary game model which includes online lending platform, financial regulators and investors on online lending market is constructed. From the evolutionary game perspective, How the strategies of online lending platform, financial regulators and investors influence the operation of online lending market is addressed, and PaipPaiDai platform is taken as a case for numerical simulation analysis. The findings show that the difference of the results of trilateral game is significant with different initial values. The evolutionary game of participants' strategy does not have stable center point and stable equilibrium point on online lending market. In addition, online lending platform tends to take self-discipline strategy when financial regulators take strict supervision measures. Online lending platform tends to select self-discipline strategy gradually with the investment amounts increase. Finally, the countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to regulate the participants' behavior and risk control on online lending market.

Key words: online lending market, internet finance, evolutionary game, trilateral game

CLC Number: