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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (2): 111-120.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.02.012

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A Multi-player Game Model about Product Quality Regulation Based on Incomplete Information

ZHAO Ying-mei1, GUO Ben-hai1,2, LIU Si-feng2   

  1. 1. School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjing 212013, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China
  • Received:2015-06-01 Revised:2015-11-19 Online:2017-02-20 Published:2017-05-03

Abstract: LongAbstract:In view of the domestic product quality and safety accidents in recent years,a topic about product quality regulation is involved in this paper.What causes the frequent occurrence of product quality and safety accidents is the information asymmetry in the product quality supervision.Owing to the complexity during the production process and the non disclosure information existed in the quality formation,those businesses who are in a strong position seek improper interest wantonly with their information superiority.While the right to be informed and other related rights and interests of the weak ones can't get the guarantee.Based on this,a three party static game model involving manufactures,dealers and government supervision department is constructed in this paper.It strengthens the rationality of the three subjects to crack the dilemma in the procedure of the product quality supervision with the interest realization mechanism.By constructing and analyzing the game model, the result shows whether these three subjects will regulate their own behavior strictly or not mainly depends on the supervision of their own,direct supervision cost and the opportunity cost of the regulation.Hence,a few of conclusion are drawn based on the research.If we want to handle the product quality issues and regulate government and enterprises behavior effectively,these three measures are supposed to be taken at the same time.Firstly,it is wise to decrease the government supervision cost by improving regulatory processes and optimizing information structure.Secondly,it is supposed to put pressure on the government and enhance government motive power to promote it to pay more attention to the product quality by using law and administrative means comprehensively.In addition,containing the local protectionism by strengthening the third party supervision is the priority among priorities.
These conclusions make a supplement to the early researches involving product quality regulation by other researchers.Besides,it makes the benefit mechanism more effectively by introducing the third variable-government.The results drawn in the research can help manufactures,dealers and government play their role better in the supervision system.

Key words: product quality, interest realization mechanism, incomplete information, multi-player game

CLC Number: