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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2016, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (4): 94-101.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.04.011

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Cooperative Advertising Game in Recruitment Service Supply Chain

LIANG Chang-yong1,2, HOU Jing-yi1,2, FU Wei-zhong1   

  1. 1. College of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China;
    2. Key Laboratory of Process Optimization and Intelligent Decision-making, Ministry of Education, Hefei 230009, China
  • Received:2014-09-09 Revised:2015-04-26 Online:2016-04-20 Published:2016-04-29

Abstract: Suitable talents are critical for enterprises to develop market, to amplify advantage and to get comparative competition. Web recruitment advertisement is one of the most important strategy means for global enterprises to compete for excellent talents. To improve recruitment effect, an Enterprise Employer (EE) and several Recruitment Web Servicers (RWSs) constitute a Service Supply Chain (SSC) to share cooperative advertising for attracting expected applicants to offer resumes. First, the RWSs design their own serving packages, including recruitment position price (w), advertisement density (x) and advertisement sharing rate (t). Secondly, the EE selects appropriate RWS(s) by predicting amount of applicants' resumes to be received from different RWSs. Finally, EE pays for recruitment package and collects resumes with continuous website advertising during a suitable period. RWSs help EE with necessary services according to SSC contract. Supposing the amount of applicants' resumes (y) to be received by EE is a decreasing function of searching price (p) for applicants, but an increasing function of website advertisement density (x) with advertising marginal effect diminishing. That is, y(p,x)=yi-αp+r√x, wherein yi is the initial resumes amount without advertisement, α is price sensitivity and r is advertisement coefficient. Five theory propositions are proved to be correct using Steinberg Game to predict cooperative advertising effectiveness. The results are as follows:(1) For EE, the higher advertising effectiveness is, the lower searching prices for job seekers, the more candidates will apply for vacancies by offering resumes.(2) For RWS, the more sharing ratio is,the higher advertisement density EE wants to purchase. RWS can determine recruitment position price with sharing ratio fixed. Meanwhile, RWS can also determine sharing ratio with recruitment position price fixed. With the above Steinberg game theory of sharing cooperative advertising, one EE in Anhui province is predicting different parameters to compare three RWSs, i.e., Zhaopin.com, 51job.com and Goodjobs.cn to form a recruitment service supply chain. The real data are from the Anhui EE practice where the second writer is in charge of the recruitment for a year. The results show that Goodjob.cn is best for hiring candidates in Anhui province and Zhaopin.com is the best when hiring talents in national wide with the expected utility of RSSC maximum. The method in the paper is helpful for many SMEs to select RWSs according to recruitment package and is also contributive to talent management theory.

Key words: service supply chain, internet recruitment, cooperative advertising, steinberg game, talent management

CLC Number: