产品伤害危机预期下的最优动态广告策略

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0253

Abstract

Abstract: It is inevitable for any company to faceProduct-Harm Crisis which could inflict damage on goodwill.The deep causes of Product-Harm Crisis root in the design and production phases before the products are launched and cannot be changed or influenced by the firm.Therefore, it aims to explore the optimal dynamic advertising strategies when supply chain members envision the occurrence of Product-Harm Crisis by formulating a dynamic advertising model with the occurrence process of crisis. Using the Bellman continuous dynamic programming theory, the optimal advertising and cost-sharing strategies of both manufacturer and retailer under centralized, decentralized and cost-sharing pattern are obtained respectively.The main conclusions and managerial insight obtained from this paper are as follows:

Key words: product-harm crisis; stochastic optimal control;dynamic cooperative advertising; differential game; cost-sharing

CLC Number:

F224.3

WANG Wei-hao, MA De-qing, HU Jin-song. Optimal Dynamic Advertising Strategies with Presence of Probable Product-Harm Crisis[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(2): 204-216.

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Optimal Dynamic Advertising Strategies with Presence of Probable Product-Harm Crisis

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