软件产业虚拟集群企业间信任进化博弈研究

Abstract

Abstract: In view of the existing realistic distrust problems, such as negative cooperation attitude, the serious opportunistic behavior and low degree of resources sharing during the cooperation process among software enterprises in software industrial virtual cluster, the limited rationality of software enterprises is taken into considered, and uses evolutionary game theory is used to establish software industrial virtual cluster trust evolutionary game model by introducing the influencing factors that include cooperation income, income distribution coefficient, risk cost and the cost of breach of trust, and so on. Then in this paper the analysis about the model evolution path and results are carried on and the Matlab is used to do numerical simulation. Research shows that, by improving the software enterprises cooperation income, determining the optimal income distribution coefficient and reasonable the cost of trust breach, reducing the risk of cost, can improve the trust relationship among software enterprises in software industrial virtual cluster.

Key words: Software Industrial Virtual Cluster, trust, evolutionary game, numerical simulation

CLC Number:

C931.1

ZHAI Li-li, LIU Yu-feng, WANG Jing, LI Nan-nan. Research on Evolutionary Game on Trust among Software Industrial Virtual Cluster's Enterprises[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(12): 118-125.

References

[1] 张洪潮,何任.非对称企业合作创新的进化博弈模型分析[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(6):163-170.

[2] Nils B M, Darja S. Understanding a lack of trust in global software teams: A multiple-case study [J]. Software Process:Improvement and Practice, 2008, 13(3):217-231.

[3] Dean K, Markus M, Tanya R, et al. Trust and social collateral [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009, 124(3):1307-1361.

[4] 柴国荣,李振超,王潇耿,等.供应链网络下集群企业合作行为的演化分析[J].科研管理,2011,32(5):129-134.

[5] 接玉梅,葛颜祥,徐光丽.基于进化博弈视角的水源地与下游生态补偿合作演化分析[J].运筹与管理,2012,21(3):137-143.

[6] 龚谊承,王先甲,李寿贵.校企实习联盟模式变迁的进化博弈模型与演化路径[J].系统工程理论与实践,2012,32(9):1945-1952.

[7] 刘友金,袁祖凤,易秋平.共生理论视角下集群式产业转移进化博弈分析[J].系统工程,2012,30(2): 22-28.

[8] 于斌斌.传统产业与战略性新兴产业的创新链接机理——基于产业链上下游企业进化博弈模型的分析[J].研究与发展管理,2012, 24(3):100-108.

[9] 阮爱清,刘思峰.基于进化博弈模型的产业集群成长研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2008,29(2):91-95.

[10] 邢乐斌,王旭.基于合作溢出的机会主义行为演化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(3):68-71.

[11] 柴国荣,龚琳玲,李振超.产业集群合作创新中信任关系的演化博弈分析[J].科技管理研究,2011,31(2):36-39.

[12] Cai Gangshu, Ned K. An evolutionary game theoretic perspective on e-collaboration: the collaboration effort and media relativeness [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, 194(3): 821-833.

[13] Wang Hongwei, Cai Lingru, Zeng Wei. Research on the evolutionary game of environmental pollution in system dynamics model [J]. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 2011, 23(1):39-50.

[14] Kuechle G. Persistence and heterogeneity in entrepreneurship: An evolutionary game theoretic analysis [J]. Journal of Business Venturing, 2011, 26(4):458-471.

[15] 魏芳芳,陈福集.三方非对称进化博弈行为分析[J].浙江大学学报(理学版),2013, 40(2):146-150.

[16] 魏芳芳,陈福集.网络虚假信息中政府、企业和公民三者的进化博弈行为分析[J].运筹与管理,2012, 21(6):225-230.

[17] 高华.基于复杂性理论的软件产业集群形成与演化研究[J].中国软科学,2011,(1):193-200.

[18] Sandholm W H. Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics [J]. Theoretical Economics, 2010, 5(1):27-50.

Research on Evolutionary Game on Trust among Software Industrial Virtual Cluster's Enterprises

PDF (PC)

Knowledge

Cited

Abstract

Cite this article

share this article

References

Related Articles 15

Metrics

Comments

Recommended 10

[1]	LU An-wen, HE Hong-yang. Research on the Function of Multi-governance Model in Internet Information Service Industry——An Evolutionary Game Perspective Based on Multi-parameter Influence [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(3): 210-218.
[2]	SUN Kai, GUO Wen. Research on the Stability of High-tech Enterprise Innovation Alliance from the Perspective of Coopetition [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(3): 219-229.
[3]	ZHAO Xiao-min, MENG Xiao-xiao. Evolutionary Game Decision between Manufacturer and Remanufacturer in the Authorization Mode [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(2): 129-136.
[4]	CHEN Ying-xin, GAO Xu-tong, WEN Yan-yan. Research on Mutual Trust between Buyers and Sellers in Online Live Shopping Mode [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(2): 228-236.
[5]	CHANG Le, LIU Chang-yu, YU Tao, SUN Zhen-kai. Food Fraud Tripartite Evolutionary Game in Social Co-regulation [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(9): 221-230.
[6]	DU Zhi-ping, FU Shuai-shuai, MU Dong, WANG Dan-dan. Multi-party Behavior Game Research of Cross-border E-commerce Logistics Alliance Based on 4PL [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(8): 104-113.
[7]	QIAN Xue-song, QU Shen, KANG Jin, DU Li. A Study on Default Risk and Prevention Mechanism of China Shadow Banking——Evidence from Entrusted Loans of Listed Firm [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(7): 35-44.
[8]	ZHANG Hong-wei, CHEN Xiao-hui, WEN Jia, WU Yong-chao. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Local Regulatory Sandboxes Competition from The Perspective of Unbalanced Development [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(6): 211-221.
[9]	ZHANG Yu-hua, DAI Geng-xin, SUN Hao, HAN Guang-hua, WANG Lei. The Strategy of Trust-based Supply Forecast Information Sharing [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(5): 112-121.
[10]	ZHU Li-long, RONG Jun-mei. Drug Quality Supervision Strategy Considering Patient Feedback Mechanism under the Background of “Internet+Medical Health” [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(5): 122-135.
[11]	XU Cheng-lei, ZHAO Chen-fang, DUAN Wan-chun. Coordinated Acquisition of Trust Elements and Evolution of Potential in Low Molecular Decision-making Subjects [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(5): 176-188.
[12]	XIA De-jian, WANG Yong, SHI Guo-qiang. Self-construction Versus Merger and Acquisition: Evolutionary Game of E-commerce Platforms on Logistics Integration Competition [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(4): 122-130.
[13]	CHEN Heng, LU Wei, DU Lei. Stochastic Evolutionary Scenario Analysis of Risk Set Clustering NIMBY Conflicts Events [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(4): 131-141.
[14]	SONG Min-xue, LIU De-hai. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model for Resolution Mechanism of Mass Events [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(4): 142-152.
[15]	LIANG Xiu-feng, ZHANG Fei-lian, YAN Hong-yan. Simulation and Optimization of PPP Project Performance Payment Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(4): 153-163.