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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2013, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (3): 169-177.

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Access Rights,Organization Control and the Specific-Investment Incentives of Transnational Coporations

HONG Lian-ying, LIU Bing-quan, ZHANG Zai-mei   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Changsha University of Science & Technology, Changsha 410004, China
  • Received:2011-05-10 Revised:2012-04-22 Online:2013-06-30 Published:2013-06-20

Abstract: In this paper, the "access rights" theory of Rajan and Zingales[1] and the international production and trade models are combined to study the relationship-specific investments for transnational corporations(TNC) from the perspective of production organization. It is found that TNC incentives the suppliers to provide more exante customized investment, transfer investment and optimal ex post specialization investment, which captures the suitable inputs and profit by restricting the access to suppliers and substitute competitor. The results show that China should build up China’s international production networks and its organization control mechanism to deal with this paradox of Chinese FDI and OFDI.

Key words: network access, organization control, relationship-specific investments, transnational coporations

CLC Number: