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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (2): 137-141.

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A Research on Incentive Mechanism of Learning Hidden Information in Vertical Communication

YE Zhi-gui, YAN Guang-hua   

  1. School of International Business Management, Shanghai University of Finance and Economic, Shanghai 200083, China
  • Received:2003-10-29 Revised:2005-03-18 Online:2005-04-28 Published:2012-03-07

Abstract: To obtain the hidden information from subordinate is a basic factor for higher level authorities to make decision,researches have been done cannot solute the dilemma between efficiency and budget balance.In this article,having recognized the role of decision maker,and introducing the cost of decision maker,the authors put forward a new mechanism,which can not only solve the question of obtaining the hidden information,but also settle the questions of budget balance,profit maximum and shifting the lose to subordinate.

Key words: hidden information, vertical communication, incentive mechanism

CLC Number: