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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2000, Vol. ›› Issue (1): 43-50.

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Damping and Anti-Dumping Dynamic Games under Incomplete Information

YANG Shi-hui, ZHANG Juan   

  1. School of Eonomics, Hubei University, Wuhan 430062
  • Received:1999-08-10 Online:2000-03-28 Published:2012-03-06

Abstract: This paper first gives a brief description of the civil and foreign research for the game of dumping and anti-dumping. The emphasis is how to work out the dynamic game model of dumping and anti-dumping under the conditions of incomplete information. Then the corresponding effects on the market price, the volume of output and sales, and the state welfare are inferred, At the end, it presents several main problems for necessary further research.

Key words: incomplete information, anti-dumping, Nash equilibrium, Bayesian equilibrium, Cournot model

CLC Number: