主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2007, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (3): 114-122.

Previous Articles     Next Articles

A Revenue Incentive Model of Project Duration Coordination between Project Corporation and Contractor

CHEN Jian-hua, MA Shi-hua   

  1. School of Management, Huazhong University of Science & Technology, Wuhan 430074, China
  • Received:2006-03-13 Revised:2007-04-19 Online:2007-06-30 Published:2007-06-30

Abstract: From perspective of project corporation and contractor in construction project,problem of project duration coordination decision-making between the project corporation and one contractor through explicit incentive contract was considered.Assumed that the decision-making process is a dynamic game under perfect information,a Stackelberg revenue incentive contract model with the project corporation as the leader and the contractor as the follower was constructed based on the game theory and method of bi-level programming Based on the backw ard induction,Lagrange function was applied to find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solution of the nonlinear programming model in different conditions,and corresponding genetic algorithm was designed Finally,a numerical study showed that revenue incentive mechanism can help to actualize optimization of project duration coordination and Pareto improvement of revenue for two parties in the contract on condition that the project corporation expects the contractor to actively compress project duration furthest by supporting revenue incentive measures instead of traditional direct in structions.

Key words: project management, project duration coordination, revenue incentive, bi-level programming

CLC Number: