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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2008, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (1): 172-179.

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A Compensation Ratio Game Equilibrium Study of China’s Non-Tradable Share Reform Based on EWA Learning Model

RAO Yu-lei, XU Yan-hui   

  1. Business School, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
  • Received:2007-06-26 Revised:2007-12-23 Online:2008-02-28 Published:2008-02-28

Abstract: From the view of behavioral game theory,this paper uses EWA learning model to analyze the mechanism of the compensation ratio game,and simulates its equilibrium process. The simulation results from a sample of 936 reformed firms show that the EWA learning model successfully captured the equilibrium,which implicates that the process of the compensation game is based on strategy learning. By analyzing the model parameters,we find out that both non-tradable and tradable shareholders have strong learning ability in the decision-making,which is just an irrational learning of pure strategy from history experience,and the less weight placed on forgone payoffs by non-tradable shareholders shows that the unfair power in the game leads to the unfair equilibrium.

Key words: words ahereform of non-tradable share, the equilibrium of compensation ratio, behavioral game theory, EWA learning

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