Abstract: The matching relationship between the offline channel power structures and online channel distribution modes, and is investigated the effects of manufacturer's optimal online channel model under different offline channel power structures are explored, including offline vertical Nash equilibrium, manufacturer Stackelberg, and retailer Stackelberg game. The game theory approach is established to analyze supply chain members' optimal pricing decisions and profits in the online reselling and online agency selling distribution models, respectively. Then, the manufacturer's equilibrium profits and supply chain members' optimal prices are compared under different offline channel power structures. The findings show that:When the commission coefficient is intuitively lower, the manufacturer would choose agency selling model in three scenarios; while the commission coefficient is significantly larger, the manufacturer tends to choose reselling model in vertical Nash equilibrium case, but in manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg case, the manufacturer would choose agency selling model. When the manufacturer chooses reselling model, the offline wholesale price is the largest in manufacturer Stackelberg case, while online wholesale price is identical in three offline channel power structures. When the manufacturer chooses agency selling model, the retailer would set the largest offline sales price in manufacture Stackelberg situation, while in the case of vertical Nash equilibrium, the manufacturer would decide the largest online sales price. Our findings not only complement the literature on emerging online channel distribution but also provide several practical insights and guidelines on the coexistence of the online and brick-and-mortar channels.

Key words: offline power structure, online distribution, reselling, agency selling, game theory