Abstract:

To fully utilize the advantages of the production-capacity reservation and promote the establishment of long-term and stable cooperation between governments and enterprises， the problem of emergency material production-capacity reservation is studied under the cooperation of the supply chain based on option contracts. After deriving the decision-making of enterprise's material production-capacity reservation under different conditions， the conditions for achieving supply chain coordination is further provided and the impact of relevant factors on coordination mechanisms and the cost-benefit of both the government and the enterprise is analyzed. Based on these analyses， the superiority and practical value of the option contract compared to the quantity flexible contract established by government-enterprise cooperation is proved， and it summarizes the following conclusions and management insights：（1） Whether the enterprise establishes a production-capacity reservation cooperation relationship with the government depends not only on the government's offering of option contract prices but also on the probability of disaster events occurring during the reserve period. When the probability of disaster events occurring during the reserve period is low， the enterprise will only accept the government's contract if both the option premium and the exercise price are higher than their respective critical values. Conversely， when the probability of disaster events occurring during the reserve period is high， the enterprise will reserve a certain amount of production capacity for the government as long as the government's offered option exercise price is above the critical value. Thus， a reference basis for enterprises' decision-making on whether to participate in cooperation and how much material production capacity to reserve is provided. It also guides governments in formulating option contract prices.（2） On the basis of the enterprise participation in reservation， to fully leverage the effects of cooperation and improve the overall cooperation efficiency of the government and the enterprise， the issue of material production-capacity reservation under centralized decision-making is also explored and the conditions for achieving supply chain coordination under the option contract are provided. When the probability of disaster events occurring is low， the government will refuse to offer the contract to the enterprise due to high costs. Then， the supply chain can only achieve coordination when the probability is high. In addition， the coordination conditions under option contracts depend solely on relevant cost prices and are not influenced by the uncertainty of emergency material demand. This demonstrates not only the robustness of this coordination mechanism but also its strong application value. Based on this， it is found that under a coordination mechanism， the government's costs and the enterprise's benefits will decrease with the increase of option premiums， but the overall cooperation efficiency of both parties will not be affected. Therefore， both the government and the enterprise can negotiate the option premiums to coordinate their interests.（3） On the basis of supply chain coordination， the impact of the uncertainty of emergency material demand and spot market purchase prices on the cost-benefit of the government and the enterprise is further analyzed. It is found that as the probability of disaster events and spot market purchase prices increase， both the cost and benefit of the government and the enterprise will increase but will react differently to changes in material demand uncertainty. It is also found that， in comparison to the enterprise's benefits， the government's costs is more sensitive to the change of relevant factors. Therefore， the government should pay more attention to these changes.（4） Compared with quantity flexible contracts， it is found that option contracts not only can achieve supply chain coordination but also can increase the material production-capacity reservation and overall cooperation performance. Additionally， the range of option premiums is provided to achieve coordination and win-win situations for the government and the enterprise. Furthermore， it is found that as the uncertainty of material demand and spot market purchase prices increase， the advantages of option contracts will become more apparent， but the challenge of achieving coordination will also shift. In situations where the probability of disaster events is high， material demand uncertainty is low after the disaster， or spot market purchase price is high， the government and the enterprise should be cautious when determining option premiums to ensure that their cooperation can achieve coordination and win-win.

Key words: emergency material reservation, production-capacity reservation, option contracts, coordination mechanism