主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (12): 228-239.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.0881

Previous Articles    

Research on the Impact of the Classification Recycling Expenses Bearing Mode on the Recovery Channels and the Coordination Mechanism

Xi-qiang XIA1,Meng-yuan LU1,Biao Chen1(),Rui Wu2   

  1. 1.School of Business, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China
    2.School of Continuing Education, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 102488, China
  • Received:2022-04-24 Revised:2022-08-12 Online:2023-12-15 Published:2024-01-06
  • Contact: Biao Chen E-mail:chenbiao@zzu.edu.cn

Abstract:

Classified recycling is an important way to improve the efficiency of resource utilization, but the recycling channel will be affected by the cost-bearing modes of classified recycling. To analyze the impact of classified recycling costs on recycling channels, a game model of decentralized and centralized decision-making involving a recycler and a processor is constructed based on different cost-bearing modes of classified recycling. The main findings of the research are: (1)Classified recycling can increase the revenue of both the recycler and the processor, but only when consumers' sensitivity to the price of waste products is less than a certain threshold, the recycler and the processor are willing to carry out classified recycling; (2)When decentralized decision-making, both the processor and the recycler are responsible for the classified recycling costs better than only one of them is responsible for the classified recycling costs; when the centralized decision is made, the classified recycling effort, the number of waste products recycled, and the revenue of the recycling channel are better than the situation when the decentralized decision is made; (3) Designing a coordination mechanism based on Nash bargaining cost sharing contract is beneficial to increase the revenue of the processor and the recycling channel, but the revenue of the recycler is damaged in this contract model; (4) The two-part tariff contract and revenue-sharing contract, by reallocating equilibrium profits of the recycling channel under the Nash bargaining cost-sharing contract model, can increase the profits of the recycler and the processor when the ratio of fixed fees promised by the processor to the recycler and the profit sharing is within a certain range. This results in Pareto improvement in the supply chain. However, the overall profit of the recycling channel does not reach the level of centralized decision-making; (5) The revenue-sharing-cost-sharing contract not only increases the profits of of the recycler and the processor but also achieves centralized decision-making of overall profit in the recycling channel, thereby achieving supply chain coordination.

Key words: classified recycling, recycling channels, coordination mechanism, game theory

CLC Number: