环保刚性约束下中小企业污染共治策略演化博弈分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1236

Abstract

Abstract:

The impact of rigid environmental constraints on SMEs （Small and Medium-sized Enterprises） will further affect the development of core supply chain enterprises and society， which may lead to supply chain disruptions， such as “Schaeffler incident”. Involving the core enterprises of the supply chain in pollution treatment of SMEs has been an important way， to make enterprises in the supply chain pay more attention to the environmental issues of upstream and downstream enterprises.Based on the perspective of evolutionary game， with the core enterprises being the main members of the supply chain participated in the pollution management of SMEs， a three-party evolutionary game model containing government， core enterprises， and SMEs is constructed. According to the parameters such as production restriction coefficient and incentive effect coefficient， the impact of supply chain disruption caused by SMEs pollution on the government and core enterprises is analyzed， and corresponding co-governance strategies is proposed by solving the stable points of tripartite evolution under different situations.Results show that the government tends to subsidize SMEs through the supply chain， and core enterprises are more sensitive to incentives and SMEs are more sensitive to penalties in terms of strategy choice. The effect of production restrictions on core enterprises and SMEs is different. Lower production restrictions cannot influence the strategy choice of core enterprises and will increase the burden of SMEs. Only if both the environmental incentives and production restriction strategies are conducted well， the strategy of core enterprises’ involvement in the pollution treatment will work efficiently.

Key words: small and medium-sized enterprises （SEMs）, pollution co-governance, the mechanism of subsidy or punishment, green supply chain, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

F224

Chun-bing BAO,Zong-kai JIN,Xiao-xia RONG, et al. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Pollution Co-governance Strategies for SMEs under Rigid Environmental Constraints[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(9): 137-147.

Figures/Tables 10

参数	含义
$R 1$	企业生产经营下政府税收收益
$R 2$	核心企业生产经营收益
$R 3$	中小企业生产经营收益
$G$	中小企业参与绿色生产政府获得的环保收益
$P$	政府激励供应链绿色生产获得的激励收益
$R$	核心企业进行绿色补贴获得的收益
$C 1$	中小企不参与绿色生产时政府环境污染损失
$C 2$	核心企业参与绿色补贴的额外成本
$C 3$	中小企业进行绿色生产的额外成本
$S 2$	中小企业不参与绿色生产时核心企业的损失
$S 3$	核心企业补贴时中小企业不参与的潜在损失
$W$	政府环保激励资金
$T$	核心企业对中小企业的绿色补贴额度
$F$	中小企业不参与绿色生产时政府罚款
$k$	政府直接补贴中小企业的补贴效果系数
$a$	政府激励下核心企业和中小企业收益增加系数
$b$	中小企业非绿色生产下政府的限产系数

策略选择				政府
策略选择				激励限产 $x$	治理惩罚 $1 - x$
核心企业	补贴 $y$	中小企业	参与 $z$	$R 1 + G + P - W$ $(1 + a) R 2 + R - C 2 - T$ $(1 + a) R 3 + T - C 3$	$R 1 + G$ $R 2 + R - C 2 - T$ $R 3 + T - C 3$
	补贴 $y$	中小企业	不参与 $1 - z$	$(1 - b) R 1 + G$ $(1 - b) R 2 - C 2$ $(1 - b) R 3 - S 3$	$R 1 + F - C 1$ $R 2 - C 2 - S 2$ $R 3 - F - S 3$
	不补贴 $1 - y$	中小企业	参与 $z$	$R 1 + G - W$ $R 2$ $R 3 - C 3 + k W$	$R 1 + G$ $R 2$ $R 3 - C 3$
	不补贴 $1 - y$	中小企业	不参与 $1 - z$	$(1 - b) R 1 + G$ $(1 - b) R 2$ $(1 - b) R 3$	$R 1 + F - C 1$ $R 2 - S 2$ $R 3 - F$

均衡点	特征值 $λ 1$	特征值 $λ 2$	特征值 $λ 3$
$E 1 (0,0, 0)$	$- b R 1 + G + C 1 - F$	$- C 2$	$F - C 3$
$E 2 (0,0, 1)$	$- W$	$R - T - C 2$	$- (F - C 3)$
$E 3 (0,1, 0)$	$- b R 1 + G + C 1 - F$	$C 2$	$T + S 3 + F - C 3$
$E 4 (0,1, 1)$	$P - W$	$- (R - T - C 2)$	$- (T + S 3 + F - C 3)$
$E 5 (1,0, 0)$	$- (- b R 1 + G + C 1 - F)$ )	$- C 2$	$b R 3 - C 3 + k W$
$E 6 (1,0, 1)$	$W$	$a R 2 + R - T - C 2$	$- (b R 3 - C 3 + k W)$
$E 7 (1,1, 0)$	$- (- b R 1 + G + C 1 - F)$	$C 2$	$(a + b) R 3 + T + S 3 - C 3$
$E 8 (1,1, 1)$	$- (P - W)$	$- (a R 2 + R - T - C 2)$	$- [(a + b) R 3 + T + S 3 - C 3]$

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Pollution Co-governance Strategies for SMEs under Rigid Environmental Constraints

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