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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (3): 258-268.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1357

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Studying on the Influence of Recycling Promotion Models on the Waste Products Recycling and Coordination Mechanism

ZHAO Qiang1, XIA Xi-qiang2   

  1. 1. Hust School of economics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology Wuhan, 430074, China;2. Business School, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China
  • Received:2020-07-15 Revised:2020-12-01 Online:2022-03-19 Published:2022-03-19
  • Contact: 夏西强 E-mail:xqxia@zzu.edu.cn

Abstract: The consumer awareness of the environmental is one of the key factors affecting waste product recycling, and recycling promotion could effectively enhance consumer awareness. However, there will be some recycling promotion cost in the process of recycling promotion, thus, how to allocate the cost directly affects the upstream and downstream publicity efforts of recycling.The game models (YD model is the cost of the recycling promotion by the processor; YR model is the cost of the recycling promotion by therecyclers; YG model is the cost of the recycling promotion by theprocessor and the recycler; C model is centralized decision model)between a processor and a recycler are constructed based on different recycling models in order to analyze the impact of different recycling models on the recycling of waste products. Basing on the game models, firstly,the impact of recycling promotion models on the unit waste product entrusted recycling price, the unit recycling price, recycling volume and profits is comparative analyzed;secondly, using the revenue sharing-cost sharing contract achieves the coordination mechanism of upstream and downstream simultaneous recycling promotion and make the profits reach the optimal. The main results are as follows: when it is decentralized decision, it is better for the recycler to be responsible for recycling promotion when the difference between the recycling cost coefficient of the recycler and the processor is less than a certain threshold, otherwise, the processor is better for recycling promotion; when the upstream and downstream carry out recycling promotion at the same time, the unit efforts of recycling promotion, the volume of recycled waste products and the profits are greater than when only one party carries out recycling promotion, that is, when upstream and downstream recycling promotion simultaneously, the recycling of waste products is more effective for one party to carry out recycling promotion; when it is centralized decision, the unit recycling price, volume and total profits are greater than the upstream and downstream simultaneous recycling promotion, however, through the revenue sharing-cost sharing contract could make the upstream and downstream recycling promotion model to achieve the optimal.

Key words: recycling promotion, processor, recycler, game theory

CLC Number: