Abstract: Greenhouse gas emissions have attracted considerable attention of governments and consumers due to global climate problems. As a key manner, carbon tax policy has been worldwide implemented to reduce emissions. Meanwhile, consumers' increasing awareness of low carbon has begun to affect the purchasing behavior. The reference carbon emission is considered and used to characterize the impact of consumers' low carbon awareness on market demand. The behavior choice of supply chain members is investigated under carbon tax policy. In a low-carbon supply chain consisting of a leading manufacturer and a following retailer, the effects of farsighted and myopic behaviors of the manufacturer on the profits of the supply chain are studied via a Stackelberg differential game model. The manufacturer's optimal carbon emission, wholesale price, retailer's optimal retail price, and their respective profits under both behaviors are deduced. The effects of some parameters on the manufacturer's behavior choice and supply chain profit are illustrated by numerical study. The results show that the myopic manufacturer will produce products with lower carbon emissions. In myopic scenario, the leading manufacturer will not necessarily get higher profit than the retailer. The behavior choice of supply chain members depends on the impact of reference carbon emissions on demand and the ratio of revenue-sharing contract. Given that the revenue-sharing contract cannot fully coordinate the supply chain, a one-time transfer contract is further designed to coordinate the supply chain. The research results can provide theoretical guidance for operators of supply chain firms to make pricing and emission reduction decisions.

Key words: low-carbon supply chain, reference emission, carbon tax, revenue-sharing contract, differential game