考虑政府引导激励的电子废弃物回收处理决策模型研究

Abstract

Abstract: Most of e-waste have not been recycled and reused in an environment-friendly manner in China mainland, and there are mainly four kinds of collecting and recycling modes: manufacturers collecting (MDC-CMR), dealers collecting (MDC-CDR), third-party collecting (MDC-CTR) and registered e-waste treatment enterprises collecting (MDC-CR). Based on the practical situation, the decision-making problem about the e-waste collecting and recycling considering the leading of government's premium mechanisms is studied in this paper. Four collecting and recycling scenarios are discussed considering the government subsidy, decision models are established and the optimal parameters of the mechanism are discussed accordingly. It is found that the optimal retail price and the market demand of EEE in the four modes are equal. With the same amount of subsidies, the recycling rate of MDC-CMR mode as well as manufacturers, dealers and registered recyclers' profit does not change with government's premium mechanisms. It is also found that MDC-CDR mode and MDC-CTR mode are more desirable than MDC-CMR mode if given the manufacturer responsibility for collecting and recycling. Results of numerical simulations also shown that, the combination of EPR and MDC-CTR can achieve higher recycling rate. Therefore, it is suggested to encourage manufactures, dealers, consumers, and other collectors and recyclers to participate e-waste recycling program from the perspective of system, objectives and processes.

Key words: e-waste, recycling and processing, government subsidies, premium mechanism

CLC Number:

F224.9
C934

YU Fu-mao, ZHONG Yong-guang, SHEN Zu-zhi. Decision Model on E-waste Collecting and Recycling Considering the Leading of Government’s Premium Mechanisms[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(5): 131-137.

References

[1] Gu Qiaolun, Ji Jianhua, Gao Tiegang. Pricing management for a closed- loop supply chain [J]. Journal of Revenue & Pricing Management, 2008, 7(1): 45-60.

[2] Toyasaki F, Boyacι T, Verter V. An analysis of monopolistic and competitive take-back schemes for WEEE recycling [J]. Production and Operations Management, 2010, 20(6): 805- 823.

[3] 韩小花. 基于制造商竞争的闭环供应链回收渠道的决策分析[J].系统工程, 2010, 28(5): 36-41.

[4] 易余胤.不同主导力量下的闭环供应链模型[J].系统管理学报, 2010,19(4): 389-396.

[5] Wee H M, Lee M C, Yu J C P, et al. Optimal replenishment policy for a deteriorating green product: life cycle costing analysis [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2011, 133(2): 603-611.

[6] Dat L Q, Linh D T T, Chou S Y, et al. Optimizing reverse logistic costs for recycling end-of-life electrical and electronic products [J]. Expert Systems with Applications, 2012, 39: 6380-6387.

[7] Hong I H, Yeh J S. Modeling closed-loop supply chains in the electronics industry: A retailer collection application [J].Transportation Research, 2012, 48(4): 817-829.

[8] Webster S, Mitra S. Competitive strategy in remanufacturing and the impact of take-back laws [J]. Journal of Operations Management, 2007, 25(6): 1123-1140.

[9] Atasu A, Van Wassenhove L N, Sarvary M. Efficient take-back legislation [J]. Production and Operations Management, 2009, 18(3): 243-258.

[10] 周永圣, 汪寿阳. 政府监控下的退役产品回收模式[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2010, 30(4): 615-621.

[11] zdemir , Denizel M, Daniel V, et al. Recovery decisions of a producer in a legislative disposal fee environment [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 216: 293-300.

[12] Aksen D, Aras N, Karaarslan A. Design and analysis of government subsidized collection systems for incentive-dependent returns [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2009, 119(2): 308-327.

[13] Kaya O. Incentive and production decisions for remanufacturing operation [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 201(2): 442-453.

[14] 王文宾, 达庆利. 考虑政府引导的电子类产品逆向供应链奖惩机制设计[J]. 中国管理科学, 2010,18(2): 62-67

[15] 王玉燕, 申亮. 政府规制下RSC的激励研究[J].运筹与管理, 2011,20(1): 173-178.

[16] 王文宾, 达庆利. 奖惩机制下闭环供应链的决策与协调[J]. 中国管理科学, 2011, 19(1): 36-41.

[17] 范体军, 楼高翔, 王晨岚, 等. 基于绿色再制造的废旧产品回收外包决策分析[J].管理科学学报, 2011, 14(8): 8-16.

[18] 朱庆华, 窦一杰. 基于政府补贴分析的绿色供应链管理博弈模型[J].管理科学学报, 2011, 14(6): 86-95.

[19] Sachs N. Planning the funeral at the birth: Extended producer responsibility in the European Union and the United States [J]. Harvard Environmental Law Review, 2006, (30): 51-98.

Decision Model on E-waste Collecting and Recycling Considering the Leading of Government’s Premium Mechanisms

PDF (PC)

Knowledge

Abstract

Cite this article

share this article

References

Related Articles 4

Metrics

Comments

Recommended 10

[1]	ZHAO Xiao-min, MENG Xiao-xiao. Evolutionary Game Decision between Manufacturer and Remanufacturer in the Authorization Mode [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(2): 129-136.
[2]	CAO Yu, ZHOU Mo-ting, HU Han-li. Secondary Supply Chain Optimization with Social Responsibility Sensitive Consumption under Government Subsidy [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(5): 101-111.
[3]	ZHAO Hua, ZHENG Ji-chuan. The Impact of Different New Energy Vehicle Subsidy Policies on Market Stability [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(9): 47-55.
[4]	SUN Hao, ZHANG Gui-tao, ZHONG Yong-guang, DA Qing-li. The Equilibrium of Multi-period Closed-loop Supply Chain Network with Manufacturer-collection Channel under Government Subsidies [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015, 23(1): 56-64.