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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2012, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 185-192.

• ARTICLES • Previous Articles    

Co-evolutionary Mechanism of Social Network Structure and Strategy in Mass Emergency with Maintain Legal Rights

LIU De-hai1,2, WANG Wei-guo1,2   

  1. 1. Center of Econometric Analysis and Forecasting, Dongbei University of Finance & Economics, Dalian 116025, China;
    2. School of Mathematics and Quantitative Economics, Dongbei University of Finance & Economics, Dalian 116025, China
  • Received:2011-07-30 Revised:2012-01-19 Online:2012-06-29 Published:2012-07-05

Abstract: The evolutionary mechanism of mass emergency with maintain legal rights is revealed from the viewpoint of social network, and co-evolutionary model of social network structure and strategy is built in this study. Firstly, considering the changing of player’s mental model and game environment, the five-phase dynamic game model is built. And then the co-evolutionary model of social network structure and strategy is discussed based on the three phases developing course. Secondly, the co-evolutionary model of social network structure and strategy is built according to the social network characteristics of vulnerable group. The minimum number of protesters is obtained in the rational social network, altruism social network and opportunism social network. It is shown that there is less minimum number of protesters in the altruism social network, and the core members need undertake the higher protest cost in the opportunism social network. Lastly, the theoretical results are validated by the Netlogo social network simulation and a case study of boiler room enlargement in some residential district.

Key words: mass emergency, co-evolution, social network analysis, Netlogo simulation, emergency management

CLC Number: