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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2009, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (2): 52-58.

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Consumer-Driving Decision of Safety Responsibility of Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chain

MENG Jiong1,2, TANG Xiao-wo1, NI De-bing1   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology Chengdu 610054, China;
    2. School of Economics Management, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang 621010, China
  • Received:2008-08-25 Revised:2009-03-15 Online:2009-04-30 Published:2009-04-30

Abstract: Starting from one perspective of the corporate social responsibilities-the product safety and its influence on the consumers,applying the basic idea of game theory,the essay studies consumer-driving de cision for safety responsibility of manufacturer-retailer supply chain.The results show that it can heighten consumer's pay desire to g product that gmanufacturer-retailer alliance fulfills safety responsibilities bet ter,thereby achieves higher profit.The situation will incentive gmanufacturer-retailer alliance to fulfill safety responsibilities better further.Consumer will drive gmanufacturer-retailer alliance to fulfill safety responsibilities better with punishing ways if gmanufacturer-retailer alliance fulfills safety responsibilities badly,the punishing ways comefrom consumer's boycott,which will make gmanufacturer-retailer alli ance a loss of profits.The perfect decision of gmanufacturer-retailer alliance is fulfilling safety responsibil ides better on the basis of controlling cost.The study will provide avaluable guidance to the decision of supply chain.

Key words: manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance, profit allotting, safety responsibility, consumer-driving, game theory

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