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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2004, Vol. ›› Issue (5): 116-119.

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Game Dynamic Analysis about Incentive-Work-hard between Stockholder and Executive under Complete Information

LI Shi-ming, TANG Xiao-wo   

  1. School of Management, UESTC, Chengdu 610054, China
  • Received:2003-07-25 Revised:2004-07-26 Online:2004-10-28 Published:2012-03-07

Abstract: An incentive-work-hard analyzing game model between stockholder and executive is founded based on the firm’s achievement linearizing model and motive linearizing model in this paper.The dynamic equilibrium of game model under complete information is discussed.The executive’s work-hard variable and stockholder incen-tive’s variable are explained and the selected scope and interrelationship about these variables are analyzed fargo-ing.Some useful references for designing executive’s motive mechanism are given.

Key words: incentive, work-hard, game dynamic analysis, complete information

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