主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2004, Vol. ›› Issue (4): 28-32.

Previous Articles     Next Articles

Game Analyseis on R&D Policy of Upstream Firm

TIAN Ying1,2, PU Yong-jian1   

  1. 1. College of Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;
    2. Dept. of Mathematics and Computer Science, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing 400047, China
  • Received:2003-05-27 Revised:2004-06-07 Online:2004-08-28 Published:2012-03-07

Abstract: When an upstream and a downstream firm exist in the market,vertical integration can increase the upstream R&D expenditure,the downstream output,and the industry profit.This paper studies the problem whether the upstream and downstream firms can sign a contract to increase the upstream R&D expenditure,the downstream output,and the industry profit to the level after the vertical integration.It is shown that,if the upstream and downstream firms play two-stage dynamic game,the contract is not a perfect Nash equilibrium.If the upstream and downstream firms play infinitely repeated game,the contract can be signed and abided.

Key words: R&D, vertical integration, contract, game

CLC Number: