Abstract:

In this paper， the problem， what are the characteristics of a blinding agreement for forming a stable grand coalition， is studied Based on a situation of small Non-Truck Operating Common Carriers cooperating by shipment consolidation， after considering the complicated scenarios such as transport capacity， freight spot market price， penalty of waste capacity， etc.， a cooperative game model is formulated under the typical time policy. Different from other research， the designed characteristic function is a piecewise function whose non-differential point changes as the difference of formed coalition. The departure strategies under the typical time-based policy will be further refined to the four consolidation strategies. The research shows that Full-loaded transportation is not always optimal， and under-loaded transportation may be optimal. The impacts of key parameters such as the freight spot market price and the penalty of waste capacity on decision-making are further explored， which shows when no other parameters are considered， then strategy I and strategy III are directly related to the penalty of waste capacity. The feasible range of the penalty of waste capacity is also discussed. With the increase of the transport spot price on decision-making. The trajectory of the final decision is changed from Strategy IV to Strategy II to Strategy III. The game is not necessarily subadditive， and the formation of the grand coalition is also more complicated. Finally， from the perspective of myopic and farsightedness， the stability of the grand coalition is studied.

Key words: shipment consolidation, time-based policy, cooperative game, allocation, stability of the grand coalition