可再生能源配额制下能源企业技术投入与合作研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2450

Abstract

Abstract:

The era of parity Internet access with the full implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standard （RPS） is arriving in China， while the price of domestic Tradable Green Certificate （TGC） is high and the TGC market is sluggish. Since the price of TGC is tightly related to the cost of power generation， renewable energy technology input becomes particularly essential. To explore the technology input and cooperation of energy enterprises under the full implementation of the quota system， three models are constructed. A Cournot model is used to analyze the production decisions of energy enterprises under RPS； A two-stage dynamic model is constructed to reflect the technology input of renewable energy enterprises； A three-stage dynamic model is aimed at studying the R&D cooperation among energy enterprises. Furthermore， a corresponding empirical study is conducted using Chinese electricity market data for 2020 and 2021. It is found that there are improper incentives in the TGC. The technical input of renewable energy enterprises has a positive effect on the overall energy market. The existing possibility of technical cooperation will stimulate the virtuous circle between TGC market and energy market. When the quota is low， the preference of renewable energy enterprises to choose technical cooperation is also low， it could be promoted by Nash bargaining mechanism. The research provides a possible solution to the current situation of high TGC prices in China， which could be referred by the government.

Key words: renewable portfolio standard, tradable green certificates, technological innovation, r&d cooperation, nash bargaining

CLC Number:

F402

Jian Cao, Jinyi Chen, Qin Shao. Technical Input and Cooperation of Energy Enterprises under Renewable Portfolio Standard[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(9): 291-300.

Figures/Tables 10

参数	含义	变量/函数	含义
$a, b$	电力逆需求函数参数： $P = a - b Q$	$Q i$	能源商 $i$ 的发电量， $i = T$ , $G$
$θ$	可再生能源配额	$τ i$	能源商 $i$ 的技术投入
$Δ c$	能源商 $T$ 和 $G$ 的单位发电成本差	$Q$ , $P$	电力市场发电总量与价格
$γ$	绿色技术投入成本系数	$P T G C$	绿证价格
$β$	非技术合作情形下的溢出系数	$t$	纳什协商中的转移支付
$α$	技术合作情形下的溢出系数	$Π i$	能源商 $i$ 的利润
$λ$	传统能源商的谈判能力系数	$C S$	消费者剩余

变量	求解结果	变量	求解结果
$P T G C I$	$2 - θ Δ c - a 1 - 2 θ 2 1 - θ + θ 2$	$Π T I$	$b 1 - θ a - θ Δ c 2 b 1 - θ + θ 2 2$
$Q I$	$a - θ Δ c 2 b 1 - θ + θ 2$	$Π G I$	$b θ a - θ Δ c 2 b 1 - θ + θ 2 2$
$Q T I$	$1 - θ a - θ Δ c 2 b 1 - θ + θ 2$	$C S I$	$b 2 a - θ Δ c 2 b 1 - θ + θ 2 2$
$Q G I$	$θ a - θ Δ c 2 b 1 - θ + θ 2$

变量/函数	求解结果	变量/函数	求解结果
$P T G C I I$	$b γ 1 - θ + θ 2 2 - θ Δ c - a 1 - 2 θ - a θ 3 2 b γ 1 - θ + θ 2 2 - θ 4$	$τ G I I$	$a - θ Δ c θ 3 2 b γ 1 - θ + θ 2 2 - θ 4$
$Q I I$	$γ a - θ Δ c 1 - θ + θ 2 2 b γ 1 - θ + θ 2 2 - θ 4$	$Π T I I$	$b γ 1 - θ a - θ Δ c 1 - θ + θ 2 2 b γ 1 - θ + θ 2 2 - θ 4 2$
$Q T I I$	$γ 1 - θ a - θ Δ c 1 - θ + θ 2 2 b γ 1 - θ + θ 2 2 - θ 4$	$Π G I I$	$γ θ 2 a - θ Δ c 2 2 2 b γ 1 - θ + θ 2 2 - θ 4$
$Q G I I$	$γ θ a - θ Δ c 1 - θ + θ 2 2 b γ 1 - θ + θ 2 2 - θ 4$	$C S I I$	$b 2 γ a - θ Δ c 1 - θ + θ 2 2 b γ 1 - θ + θ 2 2 - θ 4 2$

变量/函数	非研发合作(N)	变量/函数	研发合作(C)
$P T G C I I I_N$	$b γ A 2 - θ Δ c - a 1 - 2 θ - a θ 3 - a β 2 θ 1 - θ 2 2 b γ A 2 - β 2 θ 2 1 - θ 2 - θ 4$	$P T G C I I I_C$	$b γ A 2 - θ Δ c - a 1 - 2 θ - 1 + α 2 a θ B 2 b γ A 2 - 1 + α 2 θ 2 B$
$Q I I I_N$	$γ a - θ Δ c A 2 b γ A 2 - β 2 θ 2 1 - θ 2 - θ 4$	$Q I I I_C$	$γ a - θ Δ c A 2 b γ A 2 - 1 + α 2 θ 2 B$
$Q T I I I_N$	$γ 1 - θ a - θ Δ c A 2 b γ A 2 - β 2 θ 2 1 - θ 2 - θ 4$	$Q T I I I_C$	$γ 1 - θ a - θ Δ c A 2 b γ A 2 - 1 + α 2 θ 2 B$
$Q G I I I_N$	$γ θ a - θ Δ c A 2 b γ A 2 - β 2 θ 2 1 - θ 2 - θ 4$	$Q G I I I_C$	$γ θ a - θ Δ c A 2 b γ A 2 - 1 + α 2 θ 2 B$
$τ T I I I_N$	$β θ a - θ Δ c 1 - θ 2 2 b γ A 2 - β 2 θ 2 1 - θ 2 - θ 4$	$τ T I I I_C$	$α θ a - θ Δ c B 2 b γ A 2 - 1 + α 2 θ 2 B$
$τ G I I I_N$	$a - θ Δ c θ 3 2 b γ A 2 - β 2 θ 2 1 - θ 2 - θ 4$	$τ G I I I_C$	$θ a - θ Δ c B 2 b γ A 2 - 1 + α 2 θ 2 B$
$Π T I I I_N$	$γ 1 - θ 2 a - θ Δ c 2 2 b γ A 2 - β 2 θ 2 1 - θ 2 2 2 b γ A 2 - β 2 θ 2 1 - θ 2 - θ 4 2$	$Π T I I I_C$	$γ a - θ Δ c 2 2 b γ 1 - θ 2 A 2 - α 2 θ 2 B 2 2 2 b γ A 2 - 1 + α 2 θ 2 B 2$
$Π G I I I_N$	$γ θ 2 a - θ Δ c 2 2 b γ A 2 - θ 4 2 2 b γ A 2 - β 2 θ 2 1 - θ 2 - θ 4 2$	$Π G I I I_C$	$γ θ 2 a - θ Δ c 2 2 b γ A 2 - B 2 2 2 b γ A 2 - 1 + α 2 θ 2 B 2$
$C S I I I_N$	$b 2 γ a - θ Δ c A 2 b γ A 2 - β 2 θ 2 1 - θ 2 - θ 4 2$	$C S I I I_C$	$b 2 γ a - θ Δ c A 2 b γ A 2 - 1 + α 2 θ 2 B 2$

$a$	$b$	$c T$	$c G$	$γ$	$α$	$β$	$λ$	$θ$
$650$	$3.6 × 10 - 8$	$270$	$476$	$2.64 × 107$	$0.8$	$0.1$	$0.8$	$0,0.5$

References 32

[1]	刘层层，李南，楚永杰. 可再生能源价格政策在寡头竞争市场中的比较［J］. 运筹与管理， 2017， 26（7）： 64-73.
	Liu C C， Li N， Chu Y J. A comparison of renewable electricity support policies under an oligopolistic electricity market［J］. Operations Research and Management Science， 2017， 26（7）： 64-73.
[2]	涂强，莫建雷，范英. 中国可再生能源政策演化、效果评估与未来展望［J］. 中国人口·资源与环境， 2020， 30（3）： 29-36.
	Tu Q， Mo J L， Fan Y. The evolution and evaluation of China’s renewable energy policies and their implications for the future［J］. China Population， Resources and Environment， 2020， 30（3）： 29-36.
[3]	Wang T， Gong Y， Jiang C. A review on promoting share of renewable energy by green-trading mechanisms in power system［J］. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews， 2014， 40： 923-929.
[4]	Chen C， Zhu Y， Zeng X， et al. Analyzing the carbon mitigation potential of tradable green certificates based on a TGC-FFSRO model： A case study in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region， China［J］. Science of The Total Environment， 2018， 630： 469-486.
[5]	Unger T， Ahlgren E O. Impacts of a common green certificate market on electricity and CO₂-emission markets in the Nordic countries［J］. Energy Policy， 2005， 33（16）： 2152-2163.
[6]	del Río P， Gual M. The promotion of green electricity in Europe： Present and future［J］. European Environment， 2004， 14（4）： 219-234.
[7]	Yu X， Ge S， Zhou D， et al. Whether feed-in tariff can be effectively replaced or not？ An integrated analysis of renewable portfolio standards and green certificate trading［J］. Energy， 2022， 245： 123241.
[8]	Hindsberger M， Nybroe M H， Ravn H F， et al. Co-existence of electricity， TEP， and TGC markets in the Baltic Sea Region［J］. Energy Policy， 2003， 31（1）： 85-96.
[9]	Linares P， Javier Santos F， Ventosa M， et al. Incorporating oligopoly， CO₂ emissions trading and green certificates into a power generation expansion model［J］. Automatica， 2008， 44（6）： 1608-1620.
[10]	Hustveit M， Frogner J S， Fleten S E. Tradable green certificates for renewable support： The role of expectations and uncertainty［J］. Energy， 2017， 141： 1717-1727.
[11]	Zhao X G， Li P L， Zhou Y. Which policy can promote renewable energy to achieve grid parity？ Feed-in tariff vs. renewable portfolio standards［J］. Renewable Energy， 2020， 162： 322-333.
[12]	Yu X， Ge S， Zhou D， et al. Whether feed-in tariff can be effectively replaced or not？ An integrated analysis of renewable portfolio standards and green certificate trading［J］. Energy， 2022， 245： 123241.
[13]	董福贵，时磊. 可再生能源配额制及绿色证书交易机制设计及仿真［J］. 电力系统自动化， 2019， 43（12）： 113-121.
	Dong F G， Shi L. Design and simulation of renewable portfolio standard and tradable green certificate mechanism［J］. Automation of Electric Power Systems， 2019， 43（12）： 113-121.
[14]	Currier K M， Rassouli-Currier S. Producer incentives in electricity markets with green quotas and tradable certificates［J］. Utilities Policy， 2018， 55： 59-68.
[15]	Zhou Y， Zhao X G， Jia X F， et al. Can the Renewable Portfolio Standards improve social welfare in China’s electricity market？［J］. Energy Policy， 2021， 152： 112242.
[16]	武群丽，席曼. 基于电力供应链博弈的可再生能源政策效应研究［J］. 中国电力， 2022，55（5）： 12-20+38.
	Wu Q L， Xi M. Research on effects of renewable energy policy based on power supply chain game［J］. Electric Power， 2022， 55（5）： 12-20+38.
[17]	蔡强，卫贵武，黄晶，等. 基于社会福利的可再生能源R&D激励政策评价［J］. 中国管理科学， 2022， 30（1）： 206-221.
	Cai Q， Wei G W， Huang J， et al. Evaluation on R & D incentive policies of renewable energy power generation based on social welfare［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2022， 30（1）： 206-221.
[18]	范英，衣博文. 能源转型的规律、驱动机制与中国路径［J］. 管理世界， 2021， 37（8）： 95-105.
	Fan Y， Yi B W. Evolution， driving mechanism， and pathway of China’s energy transition［J］. Journal of Management World， 2021， 37（8）： 95-105.
[19]	苏屹，郭家兴，王文静. 多维邻近性下新能源合作创新网络演化研究［J］.科研管理，2021， 42（8）： 67-74.
	Su Y， Guo J X， Wang W J. A research on the evolution of cooperative innovation network of new energy industry based on multi-dimensional proximities［J］. Science Research Management， 2021， 42（8）： 67-74.
[20]	钟志鸣，李星梅. 燃煤机组退役与技术升级的减排及经济效益研究——基于鲁棒电源规划的方法［J］. 中国管理科学， 2021， 29（4）： 16-25.
	Zhong Z M， Li X M. Study on emission reduction and economic benefits of the retirement and technology upgrade of coal-fired units—a robust generation expansion planning approach［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2021， 29（4）： 16-25.
[21]	Zuo Y， Zhao X G， Meng X， et al. Research on tradable green certificate benchmark price and technical conversion coefficient： Bargaining-based cooperative trading［J］. Energy， 2020， 208： 118376.
[22]	Wu Y， Sun M. Multi-oligarch dynamic game model for regional power market with renewable portfolio standard policies［J］. Applied Mathematical Modelling， 2022， 107： 591-620.
[23]	龙勇，刘超，汪於. 微电网利益相关者合作运营的双层规划模型［J］.管理科学学报，2019， 22（5）： 69-82.
	Long Y， Liu C， Wang Y. A bi-level programming model cooperatively operated by the microgrid stakeholders［J］. Journal of Management Sciences in China， 2019， 22（5）： 69-82.
[24]	朱庆缘，董学平，张珂铜，等. 可再生能源电力配额指标动态分配机制研究［J］. 系统工程理论与实践， 2022， 42（4）： 967-980.
	Zhu Q Y， Dong X P， Zhang K T， et al. Research on dynamic allocation mechanism of renewables quota in renewable portfolio standard［J］.Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice， 2022， 42（4）： 967-980.
[25]	刘文君，张莉芳. 绿色证书交易市场、碳排放权交易市场对电力市场影响机理研究［J］. 生态经济， 2021， 37（10）： 21-31.
	Liu W J， Zhang L F. Research on the impact mechanism of green certificate trading market， carbon emission trading market on electricity market［J］. Ecological Economy， 2021， 37（10）： 21-31.
[26]	张荣，张宗益. 电力竞价博弈中的信息结构［J］. 系统工程理论与实践， 2013， 33（1）： 92-98.
	Zhang R， Zhang Z Y. Information structures in generator bidding［J］. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice， 2013， 33（1）： 92-98.
[27]	陈威，田永乐，马永开，等. 可再生能源储能租赁模式对电力质量和电价决策的影响［J］. 中国管理科学， 2024， 32（1）： 309-318.
	Chen W， Tian Y L， Ma Y K， et al. Impact of leasing mode with renewable energy storage equipment on electricity quality and price［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2024， 32（1）： 309-318.
[28]	许博，左莉琳，金珈伊，等. 基于演化博弈的“双边-集中” 电力市场交易机制研究［J］. 中国管理科学， 2023， 31（8）： 193-203.
	Xu B， Zuo L L， Jin J Y， et al. An evolutionary game theoretic approach to analyze “bilateral-centralized” power market［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2023， 31（8）： 193-203.
[29]	赵新刚，任领志，万冠. 可再生能源配额制、发电厂商的策略行为与演化［J］. 中国管理科学， 2019， 27（3）： 168-179.
	Zhao X G， Ren L Z， Wan G. Renewable portfolio standards， the strategic behavior of power producers and evolution［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2019， 27（3）： 168-179.
[30]	周晓晗，张江华，徐进. 基于序贯博弈的企业研发合作动机研究［J］.管理科学学报，2021，24（2）： 111-126.
	Zhou X H， Zhang J H， Xu J. Research on the motivation for R & D cooperation between firms based on sequential game［J］. Journal of Management Sciences in China， 2021， 24（2）： 111-126.
[31]	Cheng J， Gong B， Li B. Cooperation strategy of technology licensing based on evolutionary game［J］. Annals of Operations Research， 2018， 268（1）： 387-404.
[32]	汪辉，赵新刚，任领志，等. 可再生能源配额制与中国能源低碳转型［J］. 财经论丛， 2021（9）： 104-113.
	Wang H， Zhao X G， Ren L Z， et al. Renewable portfolio standards and China’s low-carbon energy transition［J］. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics， 2021（9）： 104-113.

Technical Input and Cooperation of Energy Enterprises under Renewable Portfolio Standard

RichHTML

PDF (PC)

Knowledge

Abstract

Cite this article

share this article

Figures/Tables 10

References 32

Related Articles 15

Metrics

Comments

Recommended 0

[1]	Chengchao Lv, Yanjie Jiang, Jiahao He. Carbon Emission Reduction Effect of Green Financial Policies: Evidence from the Green Financial Reform and Innovation Pilot Zone [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(3): 360-368.
[2]	WU Bai-yu, ZHONG Wei-jun, MEI Shu-e. Is the Subcontractors’ Altruism really Beneficial to Public Goods Technological Innovation under Dual Dependence? [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(2): 182-194.
[3]	ZHOU De-qun, , ZHOU Xian-yang, , DING Hao,. Research on Renewable Electricity Bidding Strategy under Multi-market Coordination [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(1): 248-255.
[4]	OUYANG Xiao-ling, ZHANG Jun-hao, DU Gang. Environmental Regulation and Green Technological Innovation: Impact Mechanism Analysis and Spatial Spillover Effects [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(12): 141-151.
[5]	HU Jun, WU Jun-min, WU Jie, SHENG Yong-xiang, SHI Qin-fen. Research on the Competition and Coordination of Photovoltaic Industry Supply Chain Driven by Innovation ——Based on Government Competition Policy [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(10): 256-264.
[6]	LIU Ying, MU Yin-ping. Optimal Ordering Policy and Pricing Strategy for Holding Supply Chain Based on Bargaining Model [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(6): 160-167.
[7]	SU Yuan, LI Guang-pei. Green Technological Innovation Ability, Product Differentiation and Enterprise Competitiveness: Analysis of Energy Saving and Environmental Protection Industry Listed Companies [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(4): 46-56.
[8]	YE Tong, GUAN Zhi-min, ZHANG Da-ru, QU You. Dynamic Optimization and Coordination on Joint Carbon Emission Reduction and Advertising in a Supply Chain of Low-Carbon Goodwill Considering Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(3): 119-132.
[9]	TAN Chun-qiao, WU Xin, CUI Chun-sheng. Pricing Strategies of Tour Operator and Online Travel Agency Based on Nash Bargaining in Promotion Model [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(3): 143-152.
[10]	HUANG Li-qing, ZHANG Gong-liang. Research on Strategic Consumer Innovation Perception and Product Pricing and Rollover Strategy [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(2): 89-98.
[11]	WANG Sheng-quan, CHEN Lang-nan, LIU Ren-hao. Asset Bubbles, Technological Innovation and Economic Growth [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(10): 1-12.
[12]	WANG Xian-jia, LIU Jia. A Cooperative Game Model for International Water Sharing Problems [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(1): 1-9.
[13]	ZHAO Xin-gang, REN Ling-zhi, WAN Guan. Renewable Portfolio Standards, the Strategic Behavior of Power Producers and Evolution [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(3): 168-179.
[14]	CHEN Ye-ting, ZHU Rui, SONG Zhi-gang, YAN Dong. Research of the Impact of Financial Reform on Total Factor Productivity-based on the Empirical Data of 5 National Financial Reform Test Areas [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018, 26(9): 19-28.
[15]	FAN De-cheng, DU Ming-yue. Research on Technological Innovation Resource Allocation Efficiency and Its Influencing Factors in High-end Equipment Manufacturing Industries——Based on the Empirical Analysis of the Two-stage StoNED-Tobit Model [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018, 26(1): 13-24.