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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (2): 11-22.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2549

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Intertemporal Pricing Strategy Considering Cost Information Transparency and Learning Effect

Jun Wang,Wenkang Ma,Xinman Lu()   

  1. School of Management Science and Engineering,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222,China
  • Received:2021-12-08 Revised:2022-08-16 Online:2024-02-25 Published:2024-03-06
  • Contact: Xinman Lu E-mail:xinman_lu@163.com

Abstract:

As a result of the disclosure of the firm itself or third-parties, a firm’s product-cost information is increasingly transparent to consumers. Meanwhile, durable products usually undergo a production learning effect, which allows the firm to reduce its future unit production cost in the process of repeated manufacturing. Cost transparency, production learning effect and strategic consumers are considered simultaneously in this study. Thus, research questions could be proposed as follows. First, how does the production learning effect affect the pricing strategy and profit of a firm, as well as consumer surplus? Second, under the existence of production learning effect, what is the firm's cost information disclosure strategy? What are the functions of cost transparency? Finally, will the production learning effect change the role of cost transparency?To answer the above questions, a two-period signaling game model is established to explore how cost transparency and learning effect affect the firm’s intertemporal price discrimination and profit, as well as consumers’ strategic waiting decision and surplus. The strategies of the firm and consumers under cost transparency and non-transparency are analyzed, and the impacts of cost transparency and production learning effect are examined. Parameter β is used to indicate the degree of production learning effect.First, the results demonstrate that β can divide the equilibrium outcome into separating and pooling outcomes under information asymmetry. Second, the enhancement of production learning effect is beneficial to both the high-cost firm and consumers and harmful to the low-cost firm. Finally, when the production learning effect is not significant, cost transparency will benefit both the high-cost firm and consumers and harm the low-cost firm; when this effect is significant, cost transparency will still benefit the high-cost firm but damage both the low-cost firm and consumers. These conclusions can provide theoretical guidance for the research on strategic consumers and information asymmetry in the future. Furthermore, firms and consumers can also gain practical experience from our study.

Key words: cost transparency, production learning effect, intertemporal price discrimination, strategic consumer, dynamic pricing

CLC Number: