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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (5): 187-197.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1493

• Articles • Previous Articles    

The Research on the Quality Cost Sharing Contract in the Retailer-led Supply Chain Based on Product Liability

FAN Jian-chang1, FU Hong2, HONG Ding-jun3, WAN Na-na4   

  1. 1. School of Marketing and Logistics Management, Nanjing University of Finance & Economics, Nanjing 210023, China; 2. School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China; 3. School of Management and Economics, Jiujiang University, Jiujiang 332005, China; 4. School of Economics and Management, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang 621010, China
  • Received:2020-08-03 Revised:2021-01-10 Published:2023-05-23
  • Contact: 范建昌 E-mail:love.andyfan@163.com

Abstract: Product safety issues caused by low-quality products have become a major issue in supply chain operation management. Product safety incidents have been frequent in recent years. For example, in 2006, Dell recalled nearly 4.1 million Sony Corp notebook computer batteries that could catch fire, costing Dell more than 400 million dollars. In 2007, Tesla was forced to recall more than 50,000 Model X vehicles due to a faulty design in its supplier BremboSpA’s parking brake system. This recall has also resulted in a huge loss in Tesla’s market value. These cases reveal that a downstream firm that dominates the supply chain often bears product liability for product safety events caused by quality defects in a component made by its upstream suppliers. Therefore, it has become a crucial problem for the core downstream firm in the supply chain to design an effective incentive contract to motivate upstream suppliers to improve the quality level and reduce the increased liability costs.

Key words: supply chain; product liability; quality; cost sharing

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