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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (8): 47-56.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.08.005

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Promotion Incentive, Regional Favoritism and Environmental Performance: Evidence from the Listed Firms in China

CHEN Qiu-ping1, PAN Yue2, XIAO Jin-li3   

  1. 1. Xiamen National Accounting Institute, Xiamen 361005, China;
    2. School of Economics, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China;
    3. School of Management, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China
  • Received:2017-10-12 Revised:2018-02-17 Online:2019-08-20 Published:2019-08-27

Abstract: Local government officials' behavior choices have been influenced by promotion incentive and their regional favoritism. Choosing the A-share listed companies in China during 2009 and 2015 as a study sample,the influence of local government transition on corporate environmental performance is empirically studied. Meanwhile the mechanism behind this association between local government transition and corporate environmental performance is analyzed from the perspectives of promotion incentive and regional favoritism. It is found that the corporate environmental performance would improve when the new official was from a same city. Meanwhile the corporate environmental performance would worsen when the new official was from a different city. These findings remain robust after a battery of robustness checks. After analyzing the effect mechanism, it is found that it mainly because of promotion incentive of the new official from a different city, and regional favoritism of the new official from a same city. Not only the research on the corporate environmental social responsibility from the perspectives of promotion incentive and regional favoritism of local government officials is enrichd, but also a new way to understand the decision-making model of local government officials and corporate governance from a larger picture is offered.

Key words: promotion incentive, regional favoritism, environmental performance

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