Abstract: With the growth of market size and the intensification of market competition, there are many members in the supply chain. With the increase of supply chain members and the diversification of role types, a two-layer supply chain network based on one manufacturer and many retailerscan reflect the practical problem. The equilibrium decisions of a two-layer supply chain network considering retailers' horizontal and vertical fairness preference is studied. The impact of retailers' horizontal and vertical fairness behaviors on the equilibrium decisions of the network is discussed. The Nash game model of the lower tier supply chain and the Stackelberg-Nash game model of the upper tier and lower tier supply chain network are constructed.The equilibrium decisions of all the decision makers are established by the penalty function method.Finally, qualitative analysis of the impact of retailers' horizontal and vertical fair preference on the equilibrium decisions is carried out. Numerical examples show that the impact of retailers' horizontal and vertical fair preference weights and their vertical fairness reference coefficient are different to manufacturers and retailers. The conclusions provide some reasonable suggestions to the decision-makers of the supply chain to deal with the negative effects of fair preference behaviors.

Key words: horizontal fairness preference, vertical fairness preference, equilibrium decision