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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2018, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (10): 176-186.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.10.017

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Interests Gaming Analysis of Knowledge Transfer Among Three Parties Based on the Participation of Intermediary Organ

WU Jie1, WU Xiao-ju1, CHE Xiao-jing1, LI Peng1, SHENG Yong-xiang1, SHI Qin-fen2   

  1. 1. Economics & Management School, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212003, China;
    2. Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou 215009, China
  • Received:2016-06-30 Revised:2017-03-20 Online:2018-10-20 Published:2018-12-25

Abstract: Knowledge transfer is a complicated game process and intermediaries play a vital role. Knowledge transfer in alliance is taken as research objects and enterprises' different psychological pressures are considered. Firstly the bargaining game model between the two knowledge transfer subjects is established, then taking into the participation of the intermediary organ,this study analyzes how the revenues of the three subjects change and the influence factors.The results prove that the benefits of transfer subjects have a negative relation with subjects' mental stress and a positive relation with the opposite side's mental stress.In the process of bargaining, if the knowledge transfer subject has greater pressure, he is more likely to compromise and get fewer benefits. Knowledge transferor is in the ascendant if the two knowledge transfer subjects have the same psychological pressure. The revenue of intermediary organ is affected by the psychological pressures of game players under the participation model.When the intermediary organ cooperates with the knowledge transferor, his own pressure has little effect on the revenue. The receiver and the intermediary organ can earn large part of the revenue when the game agents have the same psychological pressure. When the intermediary organ cooperates with the knowledge receiver, his own pressure has large effect on the revenue. The transferor and the intermediary organ can earn large part of the revenue when the game agents have the same psychological pressure. At the same time, the revenue of intermediary organ is bigger when cooperating with knowledge receiver under the participation model. The revenue of intermediary organ is affected by the psychological pressures of three subjects under the dominant model. When the intermediary organ dominant the game instead of the knowledge transferor, he can earn revenue only if his pressure is lower than the knowledge transferor. The revenue has a positive relationship with knowledge transferor, but a negative relationship with knowledge receiver. When the intermediary organ dominant the game instead of the knowledge receiver, he can earn revenue only if his pressure is lower than the knowledge receiver. The revenue has a positive relationship with knowledge receiver, but a negative relationship with knowledge transferor. What's more, the role choices of intermediary organ has nothing to do with knowledge transferor's psychological pressure, it is mainly affected by the psychological pressure of knowledge receiver and intermediary organ himself. When the intermediary organ plays games with knowledge receiver, he should choose the cooperation model when both of their pressures are large. When the intermediary organ plays games with knowledge transferor, he should choose the cooperation model when the pressure of knowledge transferor is large.

Key words: knowledge transfer, bargaining game, intermediary organ, cooperation model, dominant model, asymmetric stress

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