Abstract: With the rapid development of e-commerce and logistics and express delivery industry and the change of people's consumption habits, more and more manufacturers have opened online direct channels, which form the dual-channel supply chain with their traditional wholesale channels. The manufacturer who opens an online direct channel finds that a dual channel strategy benefits him by taking away some consumers from the retailer, which makes the online direct channel become a serious competitive threat to the retailer. This is especially true when the manufacturer has less bargaining power, and the manufacturer is less likely to set a higher wholesale price and a higher price of the online direct channel since the retailer always has the power and profit maximizing incentive. Consequently, it is still a daunting task for many manufacturers to operate an online direct channel and traditional wholesale channel mixed dual-channel. Therefore, some key questions have to be addressed: How to develop a pricing strategy in an online direct channel and traditional wholesale channel mixed dual-channel to optimize manufacturer's profits? What effect do the supply chain different power structures have on the pricing decisions, demands and profits in a manufacturer dual-channel supply chain? Focusing on these issues, the manufacturer Stackelberg game, retailer Stackelberg game and Nash game models are established based on the members' different bargaining power. Then, it analyzes the impact of three power structures on supply chain participants' pricing decisions, demands, and profits. The results show that: When the market share of the manufacturer's traditional wholesale channel is smaller, (1) either when the cross-price elasticity of demand is equal to 0 or when it is not equal to 0, the influence of three game power structures on the equilibrium solution of manufacturer's dual-channel supply chain is robust to some extent; (2) the online direct channel price in the three game power structures is identical; the traditional channel price in the two Stackelberg games is identical and is bigger than the traditional channel price in the Nash game; the manufacturer's wholesale price decrease with the decline of the game dominance in the three games; (3) when the cross-price elasticity of demand is equal to 0, the influence of three game power structures on online direct channel is identical; when the cross-price elasticity of demand is not equal to 0, traditional channel demand in the two Stackelberg games is identical and is less than the traditional channel demand in the Nash game; the online direct channel demand in the two Stackelberg games is identical and is bigger than the online direct channel demand in the Nash game; (4) the manufacturer's profits and the retailer's profits decrease with the decline of the game dominance in the three games; however, the dual-channel supply chain's total profits in the Nash game is the maximum. This research complements the existing literature by concentrating on the pricing strategies from the manufacturer's point of view in an online direct channel and traditional wholesale channel mixed dual-channel. The analytical modeling results provide many interesting management enlightenments which can support manufacturers and their retailers, who are operating or intend to manage an online direct channel and traditional wholesale channel mixed dual-channel, developing appropriate pricing strategies based on their specific supply chain power structures and maximizing their financial profits.

Key words: dual-channel marketing, Stackelberg/Nash game, manufacturer, supply chain management