Abstract: A decentralized distribution closed-loop channel is considered.The manufacturer is the stackelberg leader of the channel, who has incorporated a remanufacturing process for used products into her original production system, so that she can manufacture a new product directly from raw materials, or remanufacture part or whole of a returned unit into a new product.Facing random demand of a single product with a short life cycle, a setting where the retailer has accurate demand information while the manufacturer does not is considered.Under the asymmetric and complete information condition, the product pricing, the recovery rate and the retailer's profit in make-to-order scenario and make-to-stock scenario respectively are compared.It is found that:(1) the product pricing, the recovery rate and the retailer's profit are not affected by the change of the production mode; (2) In some conditions, information sharing would increase the whole supply chain profit, but the retailer would lose the information superiority so that his profit would decrease.In order to attract the retailer to share his private information, the manufacturer and the retailer can invest to establish a security communication system jointly to assure to reach the demand information won't be revealed.Then the whole revenue of the closed-loop supply chain will be more than that in asymmetric information.For ensuring an information sharing equilibrium and an fairly revenue allocation, a nash bargain model is proposed, in which the manufacturer and the retailer not only get back the communicaiton investment cost, but also get more profit decided by their bargain power respectively and is independent of the amount of the communication system investment.

Key words: make-to-order, make-to-stock, asymmetric information, information sharing