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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2016, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (1): 91-96.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.01.011

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The Stackelberg Model of Optimal Incentive Cooperation between Main Manufacturer and Suppliers of Complex Equipments

CHENG Yong-bo1, CHEN Hong-zhuan2, HE Li-fang2, SONG Lu-lu2, WANG Yue2   

  1. 1. Nanjing University of Finance Economics, Nanjing 210023, China;
    2. Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China
  • Received:2013-11-20 Revised:2014-08-13 Online:2016-01-20 Published:2016-01-28

Abstract: Nowadays, a new organizational model called "Main manufacturer-Suppliers" model is widely applied in the R&D procedure of complex equipments such as the plane. Due to the uncertainty and complicity in the R&D, the effort of the suppliers has an important effect on the R&D level of the complex equipments. Based on the Game theory, the effort of suppliers was set as a key factor and established the Stackelberg model, in which the main manufacturer acting as a leader and the suppliers as the followers, to analyze the best incentive strategies of main manufacturer and the best effort strategies of suppliers. And the applying of the model set up in the paper was analized. The results show that the main manufacturer can increase its benefit without damaging the interests of suppliers by controlling the incentive policy. This study will provide a valuable guidance for manufacturer to coordinate the efficiency issues ahout the coorpetation of suppliers.

Key words: main manufacturer-suppliers, Stackelberg model, incentive policy, collaborative coordination

CLC Number: