基于环境信息和金融市场不对称博弈模型分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.12.007

Abstract

Abstract: Due to a lack of essential environmental information, asymmetric information can lead to some problems such as incomplete information for investment decisions and misallocation of financial markets funds in financial markets. Another game model which include three players, government, financial markets and firm is developed by incorporating government moves based on the game model of Nikolaou, Chymis and Evangelinos^[5] financial markets, environmental information asymmetry. By setting the relevant parameters, it is revealed that Nikolaou, Chymis and Evangelinos^[5] model could be covered by above mentioned game model and proved, under the conditions for participation in the government's case, that asymmetric information problem due to the lack of accurate environmental information can be solved by introducing third-party international environmental audit, so as to providing a new research angle for China's environmental problem resolution mechanism.

Key words: information asymmetry, signal transduction, financial Institutions, The third party international environmental audit

CLC Number:

F270

QU Guo-hua, ZHANG Han-peng, LIU Zeng-liang, XU Ling, ZHANG Zhen-hua, ZHANG Qiang. Game Model Analysis of Asymmetry Based on Environmental Information and Financial Markets[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015, 23(12): 53-62.

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Game Model Analysis of Asymmetry Based on Environmental Information and Financial Markets

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