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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2015, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (10): 57-66.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.10.007

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The Game Analysis of the Supply Chain Cooperative R & D and the Government's Behavior under the Low-carbon Background

ZHANG Han-jiang1,2, ZHANG Jia-yu1,2, LAI Ming-yong1,2,3   

  1. 1. College of Economics and Trade, Hunan University, Changsha 410079, China;
    2. Hunan Province Key Laboratory of logistics information and Simulation Technology, Changsha 410079, China;
    3. Economics and Management School of Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha 410114, China
  • Received:2014-07-01 Revised:2015-05-25 Online:2015-10-20 Published:2015-10-24

Abstract: In the background of low-carbon,study the optimal emission reductions for vertical supply chain with a carbon tax levied by the Government. Through the three models of no reduction of R & D、manufacturer's reduction of R & D alone and cooperation reduction,the converse method is used to solve this problem.By this method,firstly the decision is made by the manufacturer on the optimal emission reductions;then the price of products as set by the supplier and the manufactarer respectively and then their own optimal profits are gained. Through the analysis of equilibrium,It's found that the optimal emission reductions under the supply chain's cooperation R & D is more than that by manufacturer's reduction alone;The optimal emission reductions have a negative relationship with R & D cost coefficient,and a positive relationship with share proportion.At last,a numerical analysis proves that the reasonable carbon tax rates not only maximize the emission reductions, but also is conducive to supply chain's cooperative reductions of R & D.

Key words: logistics and supply chain management, carbon emissions, cooperative research and development, supply chain coordination, carbon tax

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