主体风险规避情形下多属性逆向拍卖利润分配研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (9): 33-39.

主体风险规避情形下多属性逆向拍卖利润分配研究

田剑, 陈曲

江苏科技大学经济管理学院, 江苏镇江 212003

收稿日期:2012-05-23 修回日期:2013-05-06 出版日期:2014-09-20 发布日期:2014-09-27
作者简介:田剑（1971-），男（汉族），安徽蚌埠人，江苏科技大学经济管理学院，教授，博士，研究方向：网上拍卖机制设计与收益分析.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71371088）；“青蓝工程”中青年学术带头人培养对象资助项目

Research on Profits Allocation between Supplier and Buyer with Risk-aversion in Multi-attribute Reverse Auctions

TIAN Jian, CHEN Qu

School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212003, China

Received:2012-05-23 Revised:2013-05-06 Online:2014-09-20 Published:2014-09-27

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文针对采供双方风险规避的多属性逆向拍卖环境下的利润分配与采供关系建立问题，构建了非合作与合作博弈模型，分析了主体风险态度对利润分配结果的影响，得出建立和发展合作关系的条件，并确定了利润最优分配比例。结合仿真实验得出：1）采供双方非合作时，影响双方利润的因素：供应商成本参数，参与拍卖的供应商数量等。2）双方合作时，对利润的分配比例，受双方风险规避系数的影响；采购商提供给供应商的补贴受双方风险规避系数和讨价还价能力的影响。3）双方建立合作的基本条件需同时满足集体理性和个体理性，而长期合作的必要条件是双方效用最大化前提下的确定最优分配比例。

关键词: 风险规避, 逆向拍卖, 利润分配, 采供关系

Abstract: The profits allocation and conditions of building the cooperative relationship between buyer and supplier with risk reverse in multi-attribute reverse auctions are explored in this paper. Non-cooperative and the cooperative game models are constructed to analyze the risk attitudes of both sides how to impact the result of profits allocation, attain the conditions to build the cooperative relationship and determine the optimal ratio of profits allocation. Combined with the simulation experiment, it is concluded that the factors affecting both sides' non-cooperative profits include the supplier's cost parameters and the number of bidders. The ratio of the cooperative profits allocation is affected by the coefficients of risk aversion for both parties. The subsidy that the buyer provides to the supplier is affected by the parties' coefficients of risk aversion and their bargaining power. The basic conditions of establishing cooperative relationship include collective rationality and individual rationality, which are captured by the information sharing between both sides and the incremental profits allocation. Finally, the necessary condition of maintaining and developing a long-term cooperative relationship is an optimal distribution ratio, which maximizes utility for both sides.

Key words: risk aversion, reverse auction, profits allocation, buyer-supplier relationship

中图分类号:

F713.36

田剑, 陈曲. 主体风险规避情形下多属性逆向拍卖利润分配研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(9): 33-39.

TIAN Jian, CHEN Qu. Research on Profits Allocation between Supplier and Buyer with Risk-aversion in Multi-attribute Reverse Auctions[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(9): 33-39.

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