考虑成员风险规避的双渠道绿色供应链定价与绿色投入决策研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.2336

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本研究聚焦供应链成员风险偏好对双渠道绿色供应链的影响，在构建以供应商为主导的双层供应链模型基础上，研究成员间风险规避系数对产品绿色度、线上以及线下销售价格的影响。研究表明供应商的风险规避行为显著影响供应链绿色水平，导致产品绿色度、线上价格、线下价格降低，但零售商的风险规避行为会导致产品绿色度、线上价格升高，同时线下价格受到消费者绿色偏好的影响，当消费者绿色偏好水平较低时，零售商风险规避行为导致线下价格降低，而当消费者绿色偏好水平较高时，零售商风险规避行为导致线下价格升高；在供应商风险中性，零售商风险规避时，产品的绿色度最高，在供应商风险规避，零售商风险中性者时，产品绿色度最低。

关键词: 双渠道；绿色供应链；风险规避；定价策略；Stackelberg 博弈

Abstract: Chinese economy is stepping forward from the stage of high-speed growth to the stage of high-quality development, and green development has become the indispensable requirement of high-quality development. With the proposal of the national goal of ‘carbon neutrality’ and ‘emission peak’, the green development of enterprises is facing unprecedented opportunities. Green supply chain has become an important source of competitive advantage. How to promote the green development of supply chain has become an important issue to be solved by industry and academia. Due to the great uncertainty of market demand, supply chain members show risk aversion preference, which affects the level of green technology investment and pricing decisions. In the current research about dual channel supply chain，however，there are few studies on this phenomenon this study effectively makes up for the lack of this research.

Key words: dual channel; green supply chain; risk aversion; pricing strategy; stackelberg game

中图分类号:

F274

熊峰, 魏瑶瑶, 王琼林, 李知远, 邵乐. 考虑成员风险规避的双渠道绿色供应链定价与绿色投入决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(8): 267-276.

XIONG Feng, WEI Yao-yao, WANG Qiong-lin, LI Zhi-yuan, SHAO Le. Study on Pricing and Green Input Decision of Dual-channel Green Supply Chain Based on Risk Aversion of Members[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(8): 267-276.

参考文献

［1］唐书传,刘云志,肖条军.考虑社会责任的供应链定价与碳减排决策［J］.中国管理科学,2020,28(4):99-108.Tang Shuchuan,Liu Yunzhi,Xiao Tiaojun.Pricing and carbon emission reduction decisions in a socially responsible supply chain［J］.Chinese Journal of Management Science,2020,28(04):99-108.
［2］王丽杰,郑艳丽.绿色供应链管理中对供应商激励机制的构建研究［J］. 管理世界,2014,189(8): 184-185.Wang Lijie,Zheng Yanli.The construction of incentive mechanism for suppliers in green supply chain management［J］. Management World, 2014,189(8): 184-185.
［3］ Zhu Wenge, He Yuanjie. Green product design in supply chains under competition［J］. European Journal of Operational Research, 2017, 258(1): 165-180.
［4］朱庆华,窦一杰.基于政府补贴分析的绿色供应链管理博弈模型［J］.管理科学学报,2011,14(6):86-95.Zhu Qinghua,Dou Yijie.A game model for green supply chain management based on government subsidies［J］.Journal of Management Sciences in China,2011,14(6):86-95.
［5］李婧婧,李勇建,刘露,等.激励绿色供应链企业开展生态设计的机制决策［J］.系统工程理论与实践,2019,39(9):2287-2299.Li Jingjing,Li Yongjian,Liu Lu,et al.Mechanism decisions to encourage product eco-design implemented by green supply chain enterprise［J］.Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice,2019,39(9):2287-2299.
［6］但斌,徐广业,张旭梅.电子商务环境下双渠道供应链协调的补偿策略研究［J］.管理工程学报,2012,26(1):125-130.Dan Bin,Xu Guangye,Zhang Xumei.A compensation strategy for coordinating dual-channel supply chains in e-commerce［J］.Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2012,26(1):125-130.
［7］龚本刚,汤家骏,程晋石,等.产能约束下考虑消费者偏好的双渠道供应链决策与协调［J］.中国管理科学,2019,27(4):79-90.Gong Bengang,Tang Jiajun,Cheng Jinshi,et al.Decision-making and coordination of dual-channel supply chain with consumers’ preference under capacity restraint［J］.Chinese Journal of Management Science,2019,27(4):79-90.
［8］李芳,马鑫,洪佳.考虑质量不确定的双渠道闭环供应链契约协调研究［J］.统计与决策,2020,36(9):176-180.Li Fang,Ma Xin,Hong Jia.Study on contract coordination of dual channel closed loop supply chain considering quality uncertainty［J］.Statistics&Decision,2020,36(09):176-180.
［9］梁喜,蒋琼,郭瑾.不同双渠道结构下制造商的定价决策与渠道选择［J］.中国管理科学,2018,26(7):97-107.Liang Xi,Jiang Qiong,Guo Jin.Pricing policy and channel selection of manufacturers under different dual channel structure［J］.Chinese Journal of Management Science,2018,26(7):97-107.
［10］ Xu Jin, Zhou Xiaohan, Zhang Jianghua, et al. The optimal channel structure with retail costs in a dual-channel supply chain［J］. International Journal of Production Research, 2019: 1-29.
［11］浦徐进,龚磊.消费者“搭便车”行为影响下的双渠道供应链定价和促销策略研究［J］.中国管理科学,2016,24(10):86-94.Pu Xujin,Gong Lei.Pricing and promotion strategies in the dual-channel supply chain considering the free-riding behavior of consumers［J］.Chinese Journal of Management Science,2016,24(10):86-94.
［12］张玉豪,张涛.零售商风险规避对双回收渠道闭环供应链决策的影响［J］.管理学报,2021,18(4):587-596.Zhang Yuhao,Zhang Tao.The impacts of retailer’s risk aversion on decision strategies of dual recycling channel closed-loop supply chain［J］.Chinese Journal of Management,2021,18(4):587-596.
［13］ Zhou Yan, Chan Chikin, Wong Karhung H. A multi-period supply chain network equilibrium model considering retailers’ uncertain demands and dynamic loss-averse behaviors［J］. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2018, 118: 51-76.
［14］刘浪,汪惠,黄冬宏.销售成本信息不对称下供应商风险规避的回购契约［J］.中国管理科学,2021,DOI:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0905.Liu Lang,Wang Hui,Huang Donghong.The buy-back contract of supplier risk aversion under the asymmetric information of sales cost［J］.Chinese Journal of Management Science,2021,DOI:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0905.
［15］ Zhou Yongwu, Li Jicai, Zhong Yuanguang. Cooperative advertising and ordering policies in a two-echelon supply chain with risk-averse agents［J］. Omega, 2018, 75:97-117.
［16］ Xu Guangye, Dan Bin, Zhang Xumei, et al. Coordinating a dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse under a two-way revenue sharing contract［J］. International Journal of Production Economics, 2014, 147:171-179.
［17］ Wu Meng, Zhu S, Teunter. A risk-averse competitive newsvendor problem under the CVaR criterion［J］. International Journal of Production Economics, 2014, 156:13-23.
［18］李知远. 风险规避的双渠道绿色供应链定价决策研究［D］.中南财经政法大学,2020.Li Zhiyuan.Study on pricing decision of dual channel green supply chain based on risk aversion［D］.Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,2020.
［19］ Liu Z L, Anderson T D, Cruz J M. Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains［J］. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 218(3): 602-613.
［20］ Swami S, Shah J. Channel coordination in green supply chain management［J］. Journal of the operational research society, 2013, 64(3): 336-351.
［21］刘名武,刘亚琼,付巧灵.关税、权力结构与消费者偏好下的绿色供应链决策研究［J］.中国管理科学，2021，DOI：2835.G3.20210219.1725.002.Liu Mingwu,Liu Yaqiong,Fu Qiaoling.Green supply chain decisions with consideration of tariffs, power structures and consumer preference［J］.Chinese Journal of Management Science,2021，DOI：2835.G3.20210219.1725.002.
［22］ Xu Xiaoping, Zhang Mengying, Dou Guowei, et al. Coordination of a supply chain with an online platform considering green technology in the blockchain era［J］. International Journal of Production Research, 2021: 1-18.
［23］孙自来,王旭坪,詹红鑫,等.不同权力结构下制造商双渠道供应链的博弈分析［J］.中国管理科学,2020,28(9):154-163.Sun Zilai,Wang Xuping,Zhan Hongxin,et al.Game analysis in a manufacturer dual-channel supply chain with different power structures［J］.Chinese Journal of Management Science,2020,28(9):154-163.

[1]	葛显龙, 温鹏哲, 薛桂琴. 基于需求预测的两级动态配送路径优化研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(8): 210-220.
[2]	朱江华, 张旭梅, 但斌, 刘墨林, 马崧萱. 不确定需求下考虑资金约束的生鲜农产品政府补贴策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(8): 231-242.
[3]	代建生, 刘悦. 公平偏好和销售努力下供应链期权契约协调[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(7): 20-30.
[4]	和征, 张志钊, 杨小红. 云制造创新生态系统知识共享激励的演化博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(7): 77-87.
[5]	王兴棠. 绿色研发补贴、成本分担契约与收益共享契约研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(6): 56-65.
[6]	杨浩雄, 顾子跃, 王浩, 赵川. 考虑跨渠道退货的双渠道供应链最优策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(6): 116-126.
[7]	刘德文, 高维和, 闵凉宇. 可读性和吸引性对商品销量的影响——基于电影简介的文本分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(6): 167-177.
[8]	文悦, , 王勇. 双渠道制造商成本信息不对称下电商平台最优服务契约设计[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(5): 248-262.
[9]	王一雷，夏西强，张言. 碳交易政策下供应链碳减排与低碳宣传的微分对策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(4): 155-166.
[10]	吉清凯, 方刚, 赵达. 有限产能直销优先策略下双渠道供应链的定价博弈模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(4): 184-193.
[11]	韩同银, 刘丽, 金浩. 考虑政府补贴和公平关切的双渠道绿色供应链决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(4): 194-204.
[12]	赵骅, 张晗, 李志国. 零售商信息禀赋优势下制造商电商直销渠道决策[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(3): 96-105.
[13]	刘名武, 刘亚琼, 付巧灵. 关税、权力结构与消费者偏好下的绿色供应链决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(3): 131-141.
[14]	唐跃武, 范体军, 程永伟. 基于不同保鲜方式的生鲜品定价订货决策[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(3): 189-198.
[15]	张旭梅, 郑雁文, 李梦丽, 田宇. O2O模式中考虑附加服务和平台营销努力的供应链合作策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(2): 181-190.