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中国管理科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (9): 248-259.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0934cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0934

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碳交易机制下考虑公平关切产出不确定的低碳供应链减排与融资策略研究

邹清明1,刘春1,曹裕2()   

  1. 1.南华大学经济管理与法学学院,湖南 衡阳 421001
    2.中南大学商学院,湖南 长沙 410083
  • 收稿日期:2021-05-11 修回日期:2021-08-11 出版日期:2024-09-25 发布日期:2024-10-12
  • 通讯作者: 曹裕 E-mail:caoyu@csu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71972182);湖南省杰出青年科学基金项目(2020JJ2051);中南大学创新驱动项目(2020CX050)

Carbon Emission Reduction and Financing Policy of Low-carbon Supply Chain with Yield Uncertainty and Fairness Concerns under Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism

Qingming Zou1,Chun Liu1,Yu Cao2()   

  1. 1.School of Economics Management and Law, University of South China, Hengyang 421001, China
    2.Business School, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
  • Received:2021-05-11 Revised:2021-08-11 Online:2024-09-25 Published:2024-10-12
  • Contact: Yu Cao E-mail:caoyu@csu.edu.cn

摘要:

在碳限额与碳交易机制下,针对资金充足供应商和资金约束且产出不确定的制造商构成的二级供应链,研究了贸易信贷与银行信贷下考虑供应商与制造商的双向公平关切的供应链减排与融资策略。通过构建Stackelberg博弈模型,得到了减排与定价的均衡决策以及融资策略,分析了公平关切及产出不确定等对供应链均衡决策、成员利润与系统利润的影响。研究结果表明:(1)当贸易信贷的利率不小于银行信贷利率时,制造商应选择贸易信贷融资,而当银行信贷利率大于贸易信贷利率时,制造商的融资策略与制造商的初始资金有关。(2)碳减排量、订购量、供应商利润以及供应链系统利润都与制造商和供应商公平关切系数负相关;批发价与供应商公平关切正相关,而与制造商公平关切负相关,制造商利润与自身公平关切系数正相关,与供应商公平关切系数负相关。(3)产出不确定对碳减排、订货量及供应链系统利润与成员利润产生消极影响,不影响供应商批发价;低碳偏好与制造商订购量、碳减排量、供应链系统利润和成员利润正相关,不影响供应商批发价;碳交易价格与供应商批发价负相关,其对制造商最优决策、供应链系统利润和成员利润的影响与其取值范围有关。最后,利用算例分析验证了理论结果。

关键词: 资金约束, 碳限额交易, 公平关切, 产出不确定

Abstract:

Under the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism, in a two-echelon supply chain comprised of a capital-sufficient supplier and a capital-constrained manufacturer with yield uncertainty, when there exists two financing mode the bank lending credit and trade credit, the decision-making of carbon emission reduction and price of supply chain is studied that the supplier and the manufacturer all have fairness concerns. The equilibrium strategy of the members and the financing decision of the manufacturer are achieved by Stackelberg game model. The impacts of fairness concerns and yield uncertainty etc. on the equilibrium decisions,the members’ profit and system-wide profit of supply chain are also analyzed. The results show that: (1) When the interest rate of trade credit is not less than that of bank lending credit, the manufacturer should choose trade credit as financing policy. If the interest rate of bank lending credit is larger than that of trade credit, the choice of the manufacturer’s financing policy depends on the initial working capital. (2) The carbon emission reduction, order quantity, profit of supplier and the whole supply chain are negatively correlated with fairness concern of both manufacturer and supplier. The wholesale price is positively correlated with supplier’s fairness concerns while negatively correlated with manufacturer’s fairness concerns, and the manufacturer’s profit is positively correlated with its own fairness concern while negatively correlated with supplier’s fairness concerns. (3) The yield uncertainty has a negative impact on carbon emission reduction, order quantity and the system-wide profit and members’ profits of the whole supply chain, and has nothing to do with the supplier’s wholesale price. The consumers’ low-carbon preference is positively correlated with manufacturer’s order quantity and carbon emission reduction, system-wide profit and member’s profit of supply chain, and has no influence on the supplier’s wholesale price; The carbon trade price is negatively correlated with the wholesale price, and the impacts of carbon trade price on the optimal decisions of manufacturer, system-wide profit and member’s profit of supply chain is related to the value range of price. Finally, some numerical examples are used to verify the theoretical results.

Key words: capital constraint, cap-and-trade, fairness concerns, yield uncertainty

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