不完全信息R&D竞赛费用支付方式比较

中国管理科学 ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (6): 102-107.

不完全信息R&D竞赛费用支付方式比较

韩建军^1,2, 谭德庆¹, 郭耀煌¹

1. 西南交通大学经济管理学院, 成都, 610031;
2. 河南科技大学, 洛阳, 471039

收稿日期:2004-12-06 修回日期:2005-11-20 出版日期:2005-12-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371026)

Comparison on Payment Structure of R&D Contest with Incomplete Information

HAN Jian-jun^1,2, TAN De-qing¹, GUO Yao-huang¹

1. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China;
2. Henan University of Science and Technology, Luoyang 471039, China

Received:2004-12-06 Revised:2005-11-20 Online:2005-12-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 从项目业主的角度出发,运用博弈理论,比较了不完全信息条件下不同竞赛费用支付方式对项目业主总体期望收益的影响。研究表明,在不完全信息条件下,项目业主采用竞赛人竞价的支付方式严格优于采用事前固定竞赛奖金的方式。

关键词: R&D竞赛, 支付方式, 比较, 不完全信息

Abstract: On the side of sponsor,based on game theory,this paper presents an up-front fixed-prize R&D contest model and an auction R&D contest model,compares the sponsor’s total expected income at different payment structure.It is pointed out that:under incomplete information comducting aution will generally reduce the sponsor’s prize expenditure relative to fixed-prize contest.

Key words: R&D contest, incomplete information, payment structure, comparison

中图分类号:

F224

韩建军, 谭德庆, 郭耀煌. 不完全信息R&D竞赛费用支付方式比较[J]. 中国管理科学, 2005, (6): 102-107.

HAN Jian-jun, TAN De-qing, GUO Yao-huang. Comparison on Payment Structure of R&D Contest with Incomplete Information[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2005, (6): 102-107.

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