不确定条件下可再能源项目的竞争性投资决策

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.07.002

中国管理科学 ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (7): 11-17.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.07.002

不确定条件下可再能源项目的竞争性投资决策

李力^1,2, 朱磊³, 范英³

1. 中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院能源与环境政策研究中心, 北京 100190;
2. 天津师范大学管理学院, 天津 300387;
3. 北京航空航天大学经济与管理学院, 北京 100190

收稿日期:2016-10-08 修回日期:2017-02-15 出版日期:2017-07-20 发布日期:2017-09-25
通讯作者: 范英(1966-),女(汉族),河北阳原人,北京航空航天大学经济与管理学院院长,博士生导师,研究方向:能源经济学、能源市场与碳市场、能源-环境-经济系统建模等,E-mail:ying_fan@263.net. E-mail:ying_fan@263.net
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71273253）

Competitive Investment Strategy for Renewable Power Generation Under Uncertainty

LI Li^1,2, ZHU Lei³, FAN Ying³

1. Center for Energy and Environment Policy Research, Institute of Policy and Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;
2. Tianjin Normal University, School of Management, Tianjin 300387, China;
3. Beihang University, School of economics and management, Beijing 100190, China

Received:2016-10-08 Revised:2017-02-15 Online:2017-07-20 Published:2017-09-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 固定上网电价政策是促进可再生能源部署的重要政策手段。固定上网电价政策下，政府以市场电价和固定上网电价之和收购绿色电力。基于固定上网电价政策，本文建立了实物期权框架下的多主体完全抢滩博弈模型，以刻画投资者在竞争可再生能源项目时的投资决策。模型中，我们使用几何布朗运动刻画了市场电价的动态演化，同时考虑到了关于竞争对手投资时间的不完全信息对于投资决策的影响。理论方面，对手们的抢滩使得投资者的投资触发较垄断市场提早，而投资风险又使得其大于净现值原则的投资触发。数值分析显示独立于市场电价的固定上网电价越高，投资时间越早。本文的模型，可以帮助投资者在参与可再生能源项目投资时确定投资触发，同时政府可以依据投资者的反馈，制定合理的补贴价格。

关键词: 期权博弈, 不完全信息, 可再生能源, 固定上网电价

Abstract: In this paper, complete preemption game model based on the real option theory is provided to analyze the optimal investment timing for investors when they compete with counterparts for the renewable energy projects under the feed in tariff policies. A geometric Brownian motion is adopted to characterize the dynamic variation of electricity spot pricing. Also, the influence of incomplete information related to rivals' investment timings on the decisions is stuaied. Theoretically, it is proved that the investment timing is within the range with upper bound of the timing for a monopolist and lower bound of the timing decided by zero-net present value. Numerical results reveal that the more FIT level and the earlier investment timing. The proposed model is able to help investors to determine the optimal timing of the feed in tariff policies when they participate in investigating, and the policy makers can draft a reasonable FIT level according to the feedback of the investors.

Key words: options game, incomplete information, renewable energy, feed in tariff

中图分类号:

F830

李力, 朱磊, 范英. 不确定条件下可再能源项目的竞争性投资决策[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017, 25(7): 11-17.

LI Li, ZHU Lei, FAN Ying. Competitive Investment Strategy for Renewable Power Generation Under Uncertainty[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2017, 25(7): 11-17.

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不确定条件下可再能源项目的竞争性投资决策

Competitive Investment Strategy for Renewable Power Generation Under Uncertainty

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