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主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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中国管理科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (8): 44-56.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.2174

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑多主体参与的产业共性技术研发模式比较研究

郑月龙1,2, 刘思漫1, 白春光2   

  1. 1. 重庆工商大学工商管理学院, 重庆 400067;
    2. 电子科技大学经济与管理学院, 四川 成都 611731
  • 收稿日期:2020-11-18 修回日期:2020-12-11 出版日期:2021-08-20 发布日期:2021-08-13
  • 通讯作者: 刘思漫(1997-),女(汉族),重庆开州人,重庆工商大学工商管理学院,硕士研究生,研究方向:企业战略与技术创新,E-mail:Liu_siman@126.com. E-mail:Liu_siman@126.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金资助一般项目(20BJY005)

A Comparative Study of Industrial Generic Technology R&D Modes with Multi-agent Participation

ZHENG Yue-long1,2, LIU Si-man1, BAI Chun-guang2   

  1. 1. School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China;
    2. School of Management and Economic, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
  • Received:2020-11-18 Revised:2020-12-11 Online:2021-08-20 Published:2021-08-13

摘要: 将共性技术研发模式划分为市场机制模式、学研参与模式与政府参与模式,借鉴Stackelberg主从博弈思想,构建共性技术供给企业A、商业开发企业B及政府间的博弈模型,对三种研发模式下研发企业各自的最优研发努力水平、最优研发预期收益及政府最优补贴、政策引导等问题进行了分析比较。研究表明:除政府参与模式严格优于学研参与模式之外,共性技术研发模式选择需厘清各研发模式占优的关键因素及影响机理;三种研发模式下政府、企业A、企业B预期收益及研发企业A、B的努力水平受到共性和个性因素的影响,共性技术研发协同度是重要的影响因素;政府应通过补贴和政策引导支持共性技术研发,就政府补贴分配比例而言,技术弹性较大时政府应分配给企业A较大补贴比例,利润分享系数较大时政府应分配给企业B较大的补贴比例。最后,从研发模式选择、促进研发主体参与及政府精准施策等方面提出促进共性技术研发的政策启示。

关键词: 共性技术, 多主体参与, 研发模式, 比较

Abstract: In the face of profound changes in the domestic and international environment, the construction of a new development pattern driven by scientific and technological innovation is of great significance. Efforts must be made to ensure "high-quality science and technology" to underpin the development of a modernized economy. It also calls for an urgent need in the innovation in generic technologies. However, as a pre-competitive technology, generic technology is faced with a variety of R & D failures. Hence, three R&D modes are introduced in this study, which are the market mechanism mode, the university-research participating mode and the government participating mode. Learning from the Stackelberg game theory, a game model which involves the generic technology supply enterprise A, the business development enterprise B and the government is constructed to analyze and compare the optimal effort of enterprises, expected returns of all parties and the optimal subsidy and policy guidance of government under the above three R&D modes. The results show as follows: the government participating mode is strictly better than the university-research participating mode, beyond that, understanding the critical factors and influence mechanism that makes one mode the dominant is the key to choose the generic technology R&D mode. The expected returns of all parties and effort of enterprise A and enterprise B under the three R&D modes are affected by both common and individual factors, among which the cooperative degree is a key factor. Subsidy supplying and policy guidance of the government is necessary in generic technology R&D, when the technology elasticity is large, the government should allocate a relatively large proportion of subsidy to enterprise A, and when the profit-sharing factor is large, enterprise B should be allocated a relatively large proportion. Finally, some policy enlightenments are provided to promote the generic technology R&D from the aspects of choosing the generic technology R&D mode, increasing the generic technology R&D parties' efforts and introducing accurate policies by the government.

Key words: industrial generic technology, multi-agent participation, R&D modes, comparison

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