不完全信息下产品质量监管多方博弈模型

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.02.012

中国管理科学 ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (2): 111-120.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.02.012

不完全信息下产品质量监管多方博弈模型

赵荧梅¹, 郭本海^1,2, 刘思峰²

1. 江苏大学管理学院, 江苏镇江 212013;
2. 南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院, 江苏南京 210016

收稿日期:2015-06-01 修回日期:2015-11-19 出版日期:2017-02-20 发布日期:2017-05-03
通讯作者: 郭本海(1970-),男(汉族),安徽六安人,江苏大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院博士后,研究方向:管理工程、博弈论,E-mail:guobenhai@163.com. E-mail:guobenhai@163.com
基金资助:
国家自然基金资助项目（71673119，71573120）

A Multi-player Game Model about Product Quality Regulation Based on Incomplete Information

ZHAO Ying-mei¹, GUO Ben-hai^1,2, LIU Si-feng²

1. School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjing 212013, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China

Received:2015-06-01 Revised:2015-11-19 Online:2017-02-20 Published:2017-05-03

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 生产过程的复杂性和质量形成的非公开性，导致产品质量监管的信息不对称。处于强势地位的商家，凭借其信息优势大肆不当牟利；处于弱势地位的消费者，其知情权和其他相关权益得不到保障。基于此，本文构建了不完全信息下“生产企业-经销商-政府监管部门”三方静态博弈模型，从利益实现机制出发，强化各方主体在产品质量监管上的理性，以破解产品质量监管困局。研究表明，企业、经销商和政府监管部门是否会严格规范自身行为主要取决于各自的监管力度、直接监管成本以及监管的机会成本。

关键词: 产品质量, 利益实现机制, 不完全信息, 多方博弈

Abstract: LongAbstract:In view of the domestic product quality and safety accidents in recent years,a topic about product quality regulation is involved in this paper.What causes the frequent occurrence of product quality and safety accidents is the information asymmetry in the product quality supervision.Owing to the complexity during the production process and the non disclosure information existed in the quality formation,those businesses who are in a strong position seek improper interest wantonly with their information superiority.While the right to be informed and other related rights and interests of the weak ones can't get the guarantee.Based on this,a three party static game model involving manufactures,dealers and government supervision department is constructed in this paper.It strengthens the rationality of the three subjects to crack the dilemma in the procedure of the product quality supervision with the interest realization mechanism.By constructing and analyzing the game model, the result shows whether these three subjects will regulate their own behavior strictly or not mainly depends on the supervision of their own,direct supervision cost and the opportunity cost of the regulation.Hence,a few of conclusion are drawn based on the research.If we want to handle the product quality issues and regulate government and enterprises behavior effectively,these three measures are supposed to be taken at the same time.Firstly,it is wise to decrease the government supervision cost by improving regulatory processes and optimizing information structure.Secondly,it is supposed to put pressure on the government and enhance government motive power to promote it to pay more attention to the product quality by using law and administrative means comprehensively.In addition,containing the local protectionism by strengthening the third party supervision is the priority among priorities.
These conclusions make a supplement to the early researches involving product quality regulation by other researchers.Besides,it makes the benefit mechanism more effectively by introducing the third variable-government.The results drawn in the research can help manufactures,dealers and government play their role better in the supervision system.

Key words: product quality, interest realization mechanism, incomplete information, multi-player game

中图分类号:

F224.32

赵荧梅, 郭本海, 刘思峰. 不完全信息下产品质量监管多方博弈模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017, 25(2): 111-120.

ZHAO Ying-mei, GUO Ben-hai, LIU Si-feng. A Multi-player Game Model about Product Quality Regulation Based on Incomplete Information[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2017, 25(2): 111-120.

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不完全信息下产品质量监管多方博弈模型

A Multi-player Game Model about Product Quality Regulation Based on Incomplete Information

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