不对称信息下企业专利授权合同设计：基于投资溢出的视角

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1787

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

专利授权合同设计是解决供应链上下游企业专利纠纷的关键，并直接影响供应链成员的利润。本文针对由专利技术提供商和制造商构成的二级供应链，在考虑需求信息不对称及制造商技术投资行为的背景下，分析了专利技术提供商最优专利授权合同设计策略及制造商技术投资对供应链所产生的影响。研究发现：（1）仅当不对称信息情形下市场潜在需求较低时，专利技术提供商会设计“单位销售提成+一次性固定转移支付”的专利授权合同，而其余情形下专利技术提供商则会设计仅包含“一次性固定转移支付”的授权合同；（2）制造商技术投资是否对本企业及专利技术提供商有利，与市场需求类型有关，但却一定会提高需求和消费者剩余；（3）在一定条件下，制造商愿意披露私有需求信息，与专利技术提供商实现信息共享。最后，将问题拓展至不同需求类型下制造商保留利润存在差异的情形，并证明了专利授权合同存在的条件。研究结论为不对称信息下专利授权合同设计与制造商技术投资决策提供了重要的管理启示。

关键词: 专利授权, 合同设计, 不对称信息, 投资溢出, 信息披露

Abstract:

The protection of intellectual property rights stands as a pivotal concern for businesses. In recent times， a surge in patent infringement and disputes has been observed both domestically and internationally. Central to this issue is the often-unreasonable nature of patent licensing agreements between patent technology providers and assignees. A crucial element affecting these agreements is the asymmetry of information. Manufacturers， positioned at the downstream end of the supply chain， are privy to in-depth market demand information， whereas patent technology providers lack such critical information. Moreover， patent technology providers， equipped with advanced technological and patent leverage， effectively restrict manufacturers in terms of distribution power. To lessen their reliance on upstream patent technology providers， manufacturers frequently escalate their investments in technological innovation to enhance their own innovative capacities. Nonetheless， the underlying link between patent licensing and the technological investments of manufacturers remains unclear. It probes into the optimal design of patent licensing contracts and the manufacturers’ technology investments in a scenario of asymmetric information in this paper， focusing on the spillover effects of manufacturers’ technological investments.

A two-tier supply chain system is considered， consisting of a patent technology provider and a manufacturer. The patent technology provider licenses patents to the manufacturer under specific contracts， enabling it to produce and market products. Given its closer connection to the market， the manufacturer has a more accurate grasp of market demand， which is presumed to be its private information. Additionally， the manufacturer invests in technological innovation to curtail production costs. To effectively discern the private information， patent technology provider is necessitated to devise optimal patent licensing contracts， encompassing both unit sales commission and one-time fixed transfer payment.

Utilizing the principles of information economics and mechanism design theory， a dynamic game model between patent technology provider and manufacturer is constructed. Employing backward induction for the analysis， the pricing and investment level decisions of the manufacturer in response to the licensing contracts set by patent technology provider are studied. It then evaluates the optimal licensing strategies of patent technology providers under both symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios， taking into account the manufacturers’ individual participation and incentive compatibility constraints. Further， the equilibrium of the game is used to assess the spillover effects of the manufacturer’s technological investments and its strategies for information disclosure. Ultimately， it delves into the patent technology provider’s optimal licensing contracts， considering variations in the reservation profits of the manufacturer across different demand scenarios.

Several findings are obtained. First， patent technology provider is inclined to design a contract with ‘unit sales commission plus a one-time fixed transfer payment’ mainly in the scenario where the market’s potential demand is low under asymmetric information； otherwise， a contract comprising solely a “one-time fixed transfer payment” is preferred. Second， the benefit of manufacturer’s technological investments to both itself and the patent technology provider is contingent on demand types， yet invariably leads to an increase in demand and consumer surplus. Third， under certain conditions， the manufacturer is inclined to disclose private demand information， facilitating a shared information negotiation process with the patent technology provider. In conclusion， the study extends to the situation where differences exist in the manufacturer's profits under various demand types， affirming the conditions for the feasibility of patent licensing contracts.

With the focus on the spillover effects of the manufacturer’s technological investments， it delves into the intricacies of designing optimal patent licensing contracts under asymmetric information. It not only enriches the theoretical landscape of patent licensing contract design but also broadens the application of mechanism design theory within the patent licensing domain. From a practical standpoint， the findings offer critical managerial insights into the formulation of patent licensing contracts and the strategic decision-making regarding technology investments by manufacturers in the face of asymmetric information.

Key words: patent licensing, contract design, asymmetric information, investment spillover, information disclosure

中图分类号:

F274

郑本荣. 不对称信息下企业专利授权合同设计：基于投资溢出的视角[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(6): 49-62.

Benrong Zheng. Patent Licensing Contract Design under Asymmetric Information: An Investment Spillover Perspective[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(6): 49-62.

图/表 5

表1

参数和定义"

参数	定义
$a i$	潜在市场需求， $i = H, L$
$b$	价格对需求的影响程度
$p$	产品销售价格，制造商的决策变量
$γ$	制造商技术投资成本参数
$I$	制造商技术投资水平，制造商的决策变量
$R$	制造商的保留利润
$ρ$	需求为H类型的概率
$r i$	单位产品销售提成费用，专利技术提供商的决策变量， $i = H, L$
$f i$	一次性固定转移支付费用，专利技术提供商的决策变量， $i = H, L$
$Π M i j$	制造商在 $i$ 需求类型 $j$ 信息类型下的利润， $i = H, L$ ， $j = N, A, D A$
$Π P i j$	专利技术提供商在 $i$ 需求类型 $j$ 信息类型下的利润， $i = H, L$ ， $j = N, A, D A$
$Π T i j$	供应链系统在 $i$ 需求类型 $j$ 信息类型下的利润， $i = H, L$ ， $j = N, A, D A$

表1

表2

对称与不对称情形下供应链成员、系统利润以及消费者剩余"

决策情形		$Π P i j *$	$Π M i j *$	$Π T i j *$	$C S i j *$
$N$	H	$b 2 c 2 γ + γ a H (a H - 2 b c) 2 b (2 γ - b c 2) - R$	$R$	$b 2 c 2 γ + γ a H (a H - 2 b c) 2 b (2 γ - b c 2)$	$γ 2 (a H - b c) 2 2 b (2 γ - b c 2) 2$
$N$	L	$b 2 c 2 γ + γ a L (a L - 2 b c) 2 b (2 γ - b c 2) - R$	$R$	$b 2 c 2 γ + γ a L (a L - 2 b c) 2 b (2 γ - b c 2)$	$γ 2 (a L - b c) 2 2 b (2 γ - b c 2) 2$
$A$	$H$	$γ X 1 2 b (2 γ - b c 2) (1 - ρ) - R$	$γ (a H - a L) Y 1 2 b (2 γ - b c 2) (1 - ρ) + R$	$γ (a H - b c) 2 2 b (2 γ - b c 2)$	$γ 2 (a H - b c) 2 2 b (2 γ - b c 2) 2$
$A$	$L$	$γ X 2 2 b (2 γ - b c 2) (1 - ρ) 2 - R$	$R$	$γ Z 1 2 b (2 γ - b c 2) (1 - ρ) 2$	$γ 2 (b c (1 - ρ) + ρ a H - a L) 2 2 b (b c 2 - 2 γ) 2 (1 - ρ) 2$

表2

表3

制造商不进行技术投资情形下供应链均衡策略、供应链成员与系统利润以及消费者剩余"

变量	N		A
变量	H	L	H	L
$r i B j *$	0	0	0	$ρ (a H - a L) b (1 - ρ)$
$f i B j *$	$(a H - b c) 2 4 b - R$	$(a L - b c) 2 4 b - R$	$V 1 4 b (1 - ρ) - R$	$(a L - b c (1 - ρ) - ρ a H) 2 4 b (1 - ρ) 2 - R$
$p i B j *$	$b c + a H 2 b$	$b c + a L 2 b$	$b c + a H 2 b$	$b c (1 - ρ) + ρ a H + a L - 2 ρ a L 2 b (1 - ρ)$
$Π P i B j *$	$(a H - b c) 2 4 b - R$	$(a H - b c) 2 4 b - R$	$V 1 4 b (1 - ρ) - R$	$V 2 4 b (1 - ρ) 2 - R$
$Π M i B j *$	$R$	$R$	$(a H - a L) N 1 4 b (1 - ρ) + R$	$R$
$Π T i B j *$	$(a H - b c) 2 4 b$	$(a L - b c) 2 4 b$	$(a H - b c) 2 4 b$	$(a L - b c (1 - ρ) - ρ a H) N 2 4 b (1 - ρ) 2$
$C S i B j *$	$(a H - b c) 2 8 b$	$(a L - b c) 2 8 b$	$(a H - b c) 2 8 b$	$(a L - b c (1 - ρ) - ρ a H) 2 8 b (1 - ρ) 2$

表3

图1

图2

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